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ABSTRACT
The subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States in 2008, which struck the U.S.
economy tremendously, and moreover, the world’s economy. In response to the crisis, the U.S.
government enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act,
however, focused mainly on enhancing regulatory systems rather than considering how the Act
affected small-scale financial institutions, including thrifts, which play a major role in the U.S. local
housing development industry.
In addition, the Act did not accord with the principles of the Government Accountability
Office, and left certain regulatory measures intact, including the Qualified Thrift Lending test. Under
this new regime, thrifts may face difficulty maintaining their businesses because of the heavy burden
of complying with stringent and inappropriate regulations that were passed following the Act.
In addition to the problematic issues facing the U.S., Korean savings banks have also been
meeting difficulties since the Korean Savings Bank Crisis of 2010, which resulted in the failure of
twenty-five percent of total savings banks and cost more than $26 billion with more than 100,000
victims. Even though the Korean government tried to solve the problems facing the savings bank
industry after the crisis, savings banks have still been struggling to operate successfully. This lack of
improvement is in part due to deficiencies in the financial regulatory system, such as lenient and
insufficient regulations.
This dissertation analyzes how the Dodd-Frank Act adversely affects the thrift industry with
intensified regulations, and then offers suggestions on how to create more efficient regulations for the
thrift industry. This dissertation also studies how the Korean savings bank industry can overcome its
current trouble by analyzing the similarities between the savings bank crisis and two U.S. experiences,
the Savings & Loans Association Crisis of the 1980s, and the Mortgage Crisis of 2008, and by
researching what can be learned from the experiences.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Background
In 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis occurred in the United States (U.S.),

which struck the U.S. economy tremendously, and moreover, the world’s economy.
The crisis also gave rise to European sovereign default. 1 In response to the crisis, the
U.S. government enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) not only to solve the crisis but also to prevent future
crises. 2 The Dodd-Frank Act is not particularly novel—the U.S. government typically
enacts strict statutes following an economic crisis. However, the Dodd-Frank Act has
the potential to adversely affect the U.S. thrift industry.
Through the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. government has focused on removing
the notion of “too big to fail,” but has not considered the unique circumstances of
small-scale financial institutions, such as community banks and savings institutions.3
Ignoring the needs of these smaller institutions, the government has put too much
regulation on them, which may lead the institutions to meet difficulties in maintaining
their business. 4 If the U.S. financial regulatory agencies put similar levels of
regulation on thrifts as commercial banks, thrifts will struggle to survive. This is

1

One crisis, two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems, 2012 ANNUAL
INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM
ON
MONEY,
BANKING
AND
FINANCE,
http://gdresymposium.eu/papers/BurietzAurore.pdf.
2

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
3

See Louise Bennetts, Thanks to Dodd-Frank, Community Banks Are Too Small to Survive, AMERICAN
BANKER, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/thanks-to-dodd-frank-communitybanks-too-small-too-survive-1054241-1.html.
4

See Tanya D. Marsh & Adjunct Scholar American Enterprise Institute, Regulatory Burdens: The
Impact of Dodd Frank on Community Banking 1, 5 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, July 18, 2013).
1

because commercial banks and thrifts have different sizes, business types, and
business purposes. 5
The U.S. thrift industry has been providing financial services to local residents
and significantly contributing to local housing development. 6 In order to keep thrifts
alive in the U.S. financial market, this dissertation will analyze how the Dodd-Frank
Act negatively affects the thrift industry, and will then provide useful suggestions to
help the industry solve problems they may face in the future.
In addition to the problematic issues following the Dodd-Frank Act, this
dissertation also studies the Korean savings bank crisis of 2010. The crisis took place
in 2010, and resulted in the failure of one fifth of all savings banks, including the
largest and second largest savings banks in Korea. 7 It also resulted in enormous costs
to solve the crisis (more than $26 billion), and more than 100,000 victims. 8 Currently,
the savings banks are still struggling to stay in business. 9

5

See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS,
available at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main4.asp (as of June 30, 2013, all national commercial banks’
total assets, liabilities, and equity capital are over ten times greater than all national savings institutions’
according to the figures on the Statistics on Depository Institutions Reports of FDIC) (last visited Nov.
10, 2013).
6

1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 1.02[D] (2d ed. 2011).

7

Kim, Tae-jong, 4 Savings Banks Suspended, THE KOREA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at
http://www,koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2012/05/123_110426.html; Choi, Myeong-yong, KDIC,
26 Savings Banks Declared As Poor Financial Institutions for Three-Year, NEWS1, May 23, 2013,
http://news1.kr/articles/1145314; KIM, YOUNG-PHIL, WHY DID SAVINGS BANKS GO BANKRUPT? 27
(2012).
8
Kim, Ji-hwan, Savings Bank Crisis Is Financial Accident, Costing $26 Billion with 100 Thousand
Oct.
26,
2012,
Victims,
KYUNGHYANG,
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201210262120315&code=920301.
9

Im, Min-hee, Banking Industry, Acquirers have Problems to Normalize Acquired Savings Banks,
May
4,
2012,
MONETA,
http://cn.moneta.co.kr/Service/paxnet/ShellView.asp?ArticleID=2012050409000500786; Kang, A2

Korean savings banks play the important role of providing financial services
to low-income people who are unable to receive financial services from commercial
banks due to their credit status. 10 Given the necessity of the savings bank industry for
the Korean people, this dissertation will analyze the causes of the crisis, and then
provide suggestions for the savings bank industry to overcome its difficulties.
Interestingly, the Korean savings bank crisis and two financial crises in the U.S., the
Savings and Loans Association Crisis of the 1980s, and the Mortgage Crisis of 2008,
have several similarities in terms of financial regulation, making it meaningful to
conduct a comparative study in order to provide solutions for the Korean savings bank
industry.
B.

Overview
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the problems that the Dodd-

Frank Act has created for U.S. thrifts, and to suggest appropriate regulations that will
allow for the continued operation of thrifts in the banking industry. Concerning the
current savings bank crisis in Korea, this study explores what can be learned from the
U.S. experiences of the 1980s S&L crisis and the 2008 Mortgage Crisis.
This dissertation consists of nine chapters. Chapter I presents the purpose and
scope of the dissertation. Chapter II explains the Korean savings bank crisis in detail.
Chapter II also introduces the Korean financial system overall by providing an

reum, Savings Banks Are Still Poor Even After the Restructuring, HANKOOKI, Oct. 2, 2012,
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201210/h2012100221041221500.htm. These articles state
that the economic recession has negatively affected the savings bank industry. Since the savings bank
crisis, savings banks are considered poor financial institutions, and this sentiment has also negative
effects for acquirers wanting to normalize savings banks.
10

See KOREA FEDERATION OF SAVINGS BANKS, http://www.fsb.or.kr (last visited June 20, 2013).
3

overview of financial regulations, regulatory agencies, and institutions. Chapter III
explores the origins of the 1980s Savings and Loan Crisis in depth, including an
overall background of U.S. financial institutions and regulatory agencies.
Chapter IV examines whether the new regulations and regulatory agencies
after the Dodd-Frank Act appropriately regulate the thrift industry in the U.S. This
Chapter

compares

the

U.S.

Government

Accountability

Office’s

(GAO)

recommendations with the Dodd-Frank Act, and elaborates on three points. The first
point is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not achieve the consolidation of U.S. financial
regulatory agencies, which raises the concern of a possible turf battle among the
agencies. 11 The second point is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not apply differentiated
levels of regulation to different financial institutions based on risk-based criteria. 12
The third point is that the Dodd-Frank Act does not address the dependence of the
OCC on its regulated institutions for budgetary purposes. 13 In addition to these three
points, Chapter IV further examines problems with the Qualified Thrifts Lending test.
Chapter V studies how the Dodd-Frank Act adversely affects the community
banks through over-regulation, including facing greater compliance costs, and serving
standardized products and forms under the Act. 14 Because community banks and
thrifts are both minority depository institutions with small assets, and have smaller

11

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
55 (2009).
12

Id. at 60.

13

Id. at 59.

14

See Christopher Brown, “Community Banks: Paper Delivered at Fed Conference Argues For TwoTiered Bank Regulatory System,” 101 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 556 (Oct. 4, 2013).
4

and more limited business models, it can be predicted what will happen to the thrift
industry. Chapter V also provides hypothetical cases of how the thrift industry will be
affected by the Dodd-Frank Act.
Chapter VI analyzes the S&L Crisis, the Mortgage Crisis, and the Korean
Savings Bank Crisis by studying what happened before and after each crisis. Then,
this Chapter compares the crises in three ways: first, a comparison between the S&L
Crisis and the Mortgage Crisis; second, a comparison between the S&L Crisis and the
Korean Savings Bank Crisis; third, a comparison between the Mortgage Crisis and the
Korean Savings Bank Crisis. In Chapter VII, solutions addressing the threats to the
thrift industry are provided. The first solution for U.S. thrifts is to create a new budget
system for federal regulatory agencies. This solution will ensure that regulatory
agencies are more independent from their regulated institutions. The second solution
for U.S. thrifts is to require financial regulatory agencies to apply different levels of
regulation to financial institutions based on risk-based criteria. The third solution is
that regulatory agencies should be able to adopt measures that are independent from
their government’s stance on financial policy. The fourth solution for U.S. thrifts is to
adjust the percentage of the QTL test based on the decreased portion of the mortgage
lending market that thrifts currently hold. The last solution for U.S. thrifts is to permit
the thrift industry to enjoy some level of protection, and to maintain their particular
business area without losing it to competitors.
Chapter VIII suggests solutions for Korean savings banks. Learning from the
U.S. experience, the first solution is to enact new provisions for the corporate
governance structure of savings banks that require the number of owners to be more
5

than one. The second solution is to set up a new program for financial regulators to be
systematically educated and trained in order to combat corruption. The third solution
is to make regulatory agencies more independent from their government’s financial
policy agenda. The fourth solution is to reconsider the current insurance system for
savings banks. The last solution is to allow savings banks to enjoy some protections
for their unique business sector. Chapter IX is a conclusion of this dissertation.

6

II. SOURCE OF THE KOREAN SAVINGS BANK CRISIS
A.

The Korean Savings Bank Crisis
Since 2010, twenty-six savings banks have been suspended in Korea, which

is more than one fifth of all savings banks in the country. 1 Korea’s low-income class
benefitted from making transactions with savings banks, which were established to
provide financial services for the poor. 2 After the series of suspensions in 2010, the
savings bank industry has faced even more problems. 3 The major causes of the
savings bank crisis include weak regulation, inappropriate after-measures, and the
moral hazard 4 of savings bank owners (the controlling shareholders). 5
On January 4, 2011, the Korean government suspended Samhwa savings
bank. 6 Since this first suspension, twenty-five more suspensions followed, including
the suspension of Busan savings bank and Dae-jeon savings bank. 7 That the savings

1
Kim, Tae-jong, 4 Savings Banks Suspended, THE KOREA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at
http://www,koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2012/05/123_110426.html; Choi, Myeong-yong, KDIC,
26 Savings Banks Declared As Poor Financial Institutions for Three-Year, NEWS1, May 23, 2013,
http://news1.kr/articles/1145314.
2

See KOREA FEDERATION OF SAVINGS BANKS, http://www.fsb.or.kr (last visited June 20, 2013).

3

After the current Korean savings bank crisis, savings banks often face problems operating
successfully because they are considered poor financial depository institutions, see infra text
accompanying p. 8.
4

“Moral hazard is a situation in which one party gets involved in a risky event knowing that it is
protected against the risk and the other party will incur the cost,” and “in a financial market, there is a
risk that the borrower might engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view
because they make him less likely to pay back a loan.” Definition of ‘Moral Hazard,’ THE ECONOMIC
TIMES, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-hazard (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
5

Chamyeoyondae (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), Five Major Failures of Savings
Banks Policy & 26 Responsible Officials, ISSUE REPORT, 1, 4 Mar. 29, 2012,
http://www.peoplepower21.org/885934.
6

Press Release, Financial Services Commission, Sam Hwa Savings Bank Declared As Poor Financial
Institution and Ordered for Management Improvement (Jan. 14, 2011) (on file with Lee, Jin-su, Deputy
Dir., Jo, Sung-rae, Vice Gen. Manager, and Kwon, Nam-jin, Team Leader, Fin. Services Comm’n).

7

Choi, supra note 1.
7

bank crisis may give rise to serious problems in the financial market is of particular
concern because most depositors who lost their deposits are low-income individuals.
This crisis has cost the Korean society more than $26 billion, and the number of
victims stands at more than 100,000. 8
In addition, savings banks that manage to stay open, and the acquirers of
failed savings banks have struggled to normalize business. 9 Among the acquirers of
failed savings banks are a number of large financial holding companies, including KB,
Shinhan, Woori, and Hana. 10 All companies except for Woori recorded deficits since
taking over the failed savings banks. 11 More importantly, savings banks have been
considered poor institutions, which may turn away potential depositors. 12 If financial
consumers choose to make transactions with commercial banks instead of savings
banks, it may become impossible for savings banks to operate their business.
Therefore, the current Korean savings bank crisis is a very serious issue, and the
government should find solutions for both the crisis and the future of savings banks.

8

Kim, Ji-hwan, Savings Bank Crisis Is Financial Accident, Costing $26 Billion with 100 Thousand
Oct.
26,
2012,
Victims,
KYUNGHYANG,
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201210262120315&code=920301.
9

Im, Min-hee, Banking Industry, Acquirers have Problems to Normalize Acquired Savings Banks,
May
4,
2012,
MONETA,
http://cn.moneta.co.kr/Service/paxnet/ShellView.asp?ArticleID=2012050409000500786; Kang, Areum, Savings Banks Are Still Poor Even After the Restructuring, HANKOOKI, Oct. 2, 2012,
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/economy/201210/h2012100221041221500.htm. These articles state
that the economic recession has negatively affected the savings bank industry. Since the savings bank
crisis, savings banks are considered poor financial institutions, and this sentiment has also negative
effects for acquirers wanting to normalize savings banks.
10

See Kang.

11

See id.

12

Kim, Sang-hyun, In Pusan, People Prefer Commercial Banks over Savings Banks for Savings,
July
25,
2011,
YONHAPNEWS,
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/07/25/0200000000AKR20110725115400051.HTML.
8

B.

The History of Korean Savings Banks
In the 1970s, many financial consumers suffered from the extreme interest

rates of private moneylending institutions. 13 In order to eradicate such sufferings and
promote a sound financial industry, the Korean government approved the
establishment of savings banks. 14
Korean savings banks were established in 1972 not only to provide accessible
financial services to low-income individuals and small businesses, but also to promote
savings. 15 The first title given to the newly created savings banks was mutual credit
unions. 16

In addition to promoting financial services for low-income people, the

mutual credit unions were also expected to root out the moneylending businesses.17
The title of mutual credit unions was changed in 2002 to mutual savings banks. 18
Since the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, the Korean financial industry has suffered
greatly.

19

During the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, about sixty-seven

authorizations of mutual credit unions were canceled and about twenty-six unions
were merged. 20 Even more restructuring took place up until June of 2001. 21 At that

13

See Hong, Ji-min & Hong, Hee-kyoung, A History of the Transition of Savings Banks,
SEOULSHINMOON, June 14, 2011, http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20110614008010.
14

Choi, Young-joo, The Influence of Large Shareholder in Savings Bank Insolvency and Regulation,
53 PUSAN NAT’L UNIV. L. REV. 193, 194 (2012).

15

Supra note 2.

16

Supra note 14, at 194.

17

Id.

18

Supra note 5, at 7.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.
9

time, mutual credit unions engaged in several illegal activities, and their business
became competitive among many financial institutions, including the commercial
banking industry. 22 In an effort to resolve these problems, the Korean government
eventually approved the change of title from mutual credit unions to mutual savings
banks. 23 The government hoped to promote the savings bank industry and help them
to compete with other financial institutions.24 Interestingly, since the title change,
mutual savings banking has flourished. 25
Since 2002, after the title change, savings banks were able to expand their
business, including Project Financing (PF). 26 Project financing is a term that refers to
the financing method widely used for infrastructure, including plant construction,
resource development, road building, port construction, and other large-scale
investment projects.

27

Unlike general loans, project financing’s distinctive

characteristic is that the source of payment is the sales price of, or profits from, the
products that are yielded from the project. 28 In addition, project financing is backed
by project assets. 29 Therefore, the borrower’s wealth and trust, and/or a third-party
suretyship, become secondary, and the parties to the project assume the overall

22

Id.

23

See id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Supra note 14, at 202.

27

KANG, BYEONG-HO & KIM, SEOK-DONG, FINANCIAL MARKETS 143 (13th ed. 2013).

28

Id.

29

Id.
10

success of the project, namely the completion of work, production, and sale. 30 The
payment of project financing is limited to the cash flow from the project itself. 31 A
main feature of the debt payment is that it is either non-recourse, where the lender
cannot request the business owner for payment, or limited recourse, where the
lender’s claim is limited to a certain amount of the loan. 32 The major parties to
project financing are business owners, project developers, and lenders. 33 In this sense,
the title change was the first cause of the savings bank crisis. 34
C. The Korean Financial Regulatory System
Prior to the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, the Korean regulatory system
was divided into separate parts for bank financial institutions, non-bank financial
institutions, securities, and insurance. 35 However, in order to effectively cope with
several changes after the foreign exchange crisis, such as financial liberalization,
deregulation, and globalization, the Korean government considered consolidating the
financial supervisory system. 36 Soon after, the Act on the Establishment, etc. of
Financial Supervisory Organizations was passed on December 29, 1997. 37 Under the
Act, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established on April 1, 1998,

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

See infra text accompanying p. 17 for more information of title changes.

35

KWON, SUNG-HOON ET AL., FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY INTRODUCTION OF FSS, 20 (2013).

36

Id. at 21.

37

Id.
11

and the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) was established on January 2, 1999. 38
On February 29, 2008, in order to distinguish between financial supervision and
supervisory execution for efficient supervision, the government revised the above Act,
and approved the establishment of the Financial Services Commission.39 Following
the revised Act, the Financial Supervisory Commission was changed to the Financial
Services Commission. 40
The Financial Services Commission deliberates on and resolves important
issues concerning the financial system, financial policy, the supervision and regulation
of financial companies, and operation approval for financial companies. 41 The
Commission consists of nine members: the chairman, vice chairman, vice minister of
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Governor of Financial Supervisory Services, the
vice Governor of the Bank of Korea, the CEO of the Korea Deposit Insurance
Corporation, two finance experts recommended by the chairman, and one
representative of the Korean economy recommended by the chairman of the Korea
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 42
The Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) is a no-capital special legal entity
that was created to advance the Korean financial industry, promote the stability of the
financial market, establish healthy credit and fair financial transactions, and promote

38

Id.

39

Id. at 21–2.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.
12

the needs of finance demanders, including depositors and investors.

43

The

organization is independent from the central and regional governments, and it has the
character of a public corporate body in charge of public affairs. 44 FSS was not
established as a governmental body but as a public corporate body in order to ensure
that the organization did not lose its autonomy to political pressure or by influence
from the executive branch. 45 Instead, the FSS is meant to function as a neutral and
professional supervisory body. 46 FSS consists of the Governor, four or fewer vice
Governor(s), nine or fewer vice Governor-to-be, and one auditor. 47 Under the
instructions from the Financial Services Commission and Securities and Futures
Commission, FSS audits and regulates financial companies’ work and assets, and also
provides protection for financial consumers. 48 FSS is related to the Bank of Korea,
where the currency and trust policy is set and managed, and to the Korea Deposit
Insurance Corporation, where the deposit insurance fund is managed. The three
organizations have their own rights and roles in order to promote cooperation, and
serve as checks among themselves. 49
Korean financial institutions consist of bank financial institutions, non-bank

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 23.
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financial institutions, financial investment firms, and insurance firms. 50 First,
commercial banks and specialized banks are both considered bank financial
institutions, which basically receive deposits and make loans. 51 Commercial banks
are divided into three types: nationwide, local, and foreign exchange banks. 52
Specialized banks include the Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea,
Agriculture Cooperative Association, and the National Federation of Fisheries
Cooperative Association. 53
Second, non-bank financial institutions exist to provide financial services for
low-income people within different areas. 54 Savings banks; credit unions; new
community finance associations; agriculture, fisheries, and forestry cooperative
associations; the Export-Import Bank of Korea; and post offices are examples. 55
Third, under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, financial
investment firms are entities that run all or part of an investment trading business,
investment brokerage business, collective investment business, investment advisory
business, discretionary investment business, or trust business. 56 Under this Act, the
term “institutions related to financial investment business” includes financial
securities companies, merchant banks, financial brokerage companies, and short-term

50

Id. at 25.

51

KANG, BYEONG-HO ET AL., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 305 (19th ed. 2013).

52

Id.

53

Id. at 308.

54

Id. at 378.

55

Id. at 380–384.

56

Supra note 35, at 27.
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financial companies. 57 Last, an insurance company is a financial company whose
fundamental function is to fulfill the increased demand in assets in the case of insured
accidents. 58 The common pool of funds is created by collecting a certain amount of
money from each insurance holder according to a statistical calculation using the law
of large numbers. 59 The purpose of insurance is to eliminate or decrease many
economic actors’ fear of financial harm due to accidents. 60 There are also financial
holding companies. 61
D.

Why Are Savings Banks Needed?
For almost forty years, low-income individuals and small businesses have

enjoyed the less stringent loan requirements of savings banks than those of
commercial banks. 62 In this sense, if Korean savings banks disappear as a result of
the recent crisis, low-income individuals and small businesses may have a hard time
getting loans, and may have no choice but to earn lower rates on deposits from
commercial banks. If there are no savings banks in Korea, huge confusion may result
in the Korean financial market.
Savings banks are certainly needed in Korea for several reasons. 63 First, as
mentioned previously, low-income people rely on savings banks to borrow money

57

Id.

58

Id. at 32.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 32–3.

61

Id. at 34.

62

See supra note 2.

63

KIM, YOUNG-PHIL, WHY DID SAVINGS BANKS GO BANKRUPT? 145 (2012).
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because commercial banks are not willing to offer loans to them because of their
credit status. 64 Next, in order to maintain a healthy financial system, large and local
commercial banks, savings banks, and other financial institutions should exist
together. 65 Some critics may argue that commercial banks can perform the role of
savings banks for low-income people and small companies. 66 However, this would
likely be difficult because commercial banks were established to provide financial
services for big companies and for society in general rather than for low-income
people. 67 An analogy for the coexistence of financial institutions would be that of the
retail market. Big markets, such as Kroger, Target, or Macy’s are very convenient, and
they sometimes provide better and cheaper products to consumers than small shops
do. 68 Based on this fact alone, it may seem that people do not need smaller shops.69
However, that is not true because a monopoly by the big markets would result in
harmful effects. 70 In other words, bigger and smaller financial institutions must
coexist and supplement each other.

71

This coexistence would most benefit

64
See id. at 144–5; Kim, Young-phil, Financial Regulation Is Worse Than Low Interest Rates: Finding
Financial Roles For Ordinary People Is The Point, HANKOOKI.COM, Feb. 19, 2013,
http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/finance/201302/e20130219174403120130.htm.
65

KIM, at 145.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

See id. at 144.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 145.
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consumers. 72
E.

Causes of the Crisis
As mentioned above, there are several causes of the current savings bank

crisis. The major causes of the current savings bank crisis are weak regulations,
inappropriate acquirements of the failed savings banks, and owners’ moral hazard. 73
The title change and delayed restructuring are also to blame. 74
The title change was the very first cause of the savings bank crisis. 75 With
the new title, savings banks, the credit unions appeared much more reliable. Seeking
high-risk and high-return investments with the new title, the owners of savings banks
tried to make illegal connections with regulators and the government for less
regulation and more favorable policy. 76 Consequently, loose regulation following the
title change allowed the owners to use their savings banks for personal purposes,
resulting in moral hazard. 77 In addition to the title change, the government also
increased the deposit insurance of savings banks from $20,000 to $50,000. 78 This
increased deposit insurance also allowed savings bank owners to invest in high-risk
and high-return activities. 79

72

See id.

73

Supra note 5.

74

Id. at 7–9.

75

See id. at 7.

76

See id.

77

Supra note 14, at 201.

78

Id.

79

Id.
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Many owners, board members of savings banks, and regulators were indicted
and some were arrested under charges of bribery, embezzlement, and other
activities. 80 Im-suk, the owner of Solomon savings bank, the largest savings bank at
that time, was arrested for bribery, embezzlement, and illegal loans following the
suspension of the bank in 2012. 81 Kim Chan-kyoung, the owner of Mirae savings
bank was also arrested for bribery, embezzlement, and illegal loans. 82 Im-suk was
arrested for embezzling about $19 million and for illegal loans totaling around $141
million, and Kim Chan-kyoung was arrested for illegal loans totaling about $380
million and for embezzling more than $200 million. 83 Many owners of other savings
banks were arrested for similar charges. 84 As for savings bank regulators, many of
them were arrested for receiving bribes. 85 In this sense, the moral hazard of several
savings bank owners and the illegal connections between savings banks and
regulators were one of the main reasons for the crisis.
The illegal activities committed by savings bank owners were possible due to

80

Yeo, Tae-kyoung, Senior Regulators at the FSS Received Heavy Sentences due to Bribe from
Savings Banks, NEWS1, April 23, 2013, http://news1.kr/articles/1102559; Lee, Ga-young, 62 People in
Political Circles were Arrested for Savings Banks Suspicion, JOINSMSN, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=10809008&cloc=olink|article|default.
81

Supra note 63, at 27–9.

82

Id. at 56–61.

83

Id. at 29; Lee, Jae-dong, Kim Was Sentenced For 9 Years, MOONHWA, Jan. 25, 2013,
http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=20130125MW161057215015.

84

Id. at 29–56, 63–68.

85

Supra note 80; Jung, Hye-jin, Another FSS Regulator Was Arrested Due To A Suspicion of The
May
9,
2011,
Pusan
Savings
Bank,
SBSNEWS,
http://news.sbs.co.kr/section_news/news_read.jsp?news_id=N1000910449 (stating that two regulators
at the FSS were arrested for bribe, and prosecutors had plans to issue summons against 30 more
regulators at the FSS).
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the governance of savings banks in Korea. 86 Unlike the commercial banking industry,
only an owner could own savings banks allowing the owner to control a savings bank
for private purposes, including illegal activities. 87 The government allowed a single
owner to control a savings bank because savings banks in Korea were relatively
smaller than commercial banks, and were thought to pose less of a financial risk. 88
However, as savings banks have become bigger, they may pose an even larger risk
than small commercial banks do.
Another reason for the crisis was weak regulation. 89 Applying loose
regulations to savings banks may seem appropriate because savings banks are smallscale financial institutions for ordinary people. 90 The government allowed savings
banks to expand their business models by relaxing credit lines and other regulations. 91
With these relaxed regulations, however, savings banks could pursue high-risk and
high-return investment, such as PF, one of the biggest reasons for the crisis. 92
Specifically, in 2006, the government created a policy that savings banks did not have
to keep any limitation on loans of up to $8 million, as long as savings banks kept to
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ratio.

86

See supra note 14, at 207.

87

See id.

88

See id. at 195.
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Id. at 202–3.
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Id. at 195.
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See supra note 5, at 8.

92

See id.

93

Id.
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93

Internationally, the

recommendation of BIS’s Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been adopted
as the regulatory standard for a bank’s capital adequacy. 94 The Committee mandates
BIS member nations to maintain an equity capital rate of 8% or higher (the BIS rate),
and non-members, in the hopes of increasing international recognition of their
national banking industry, also abide by the rate. 95
The Korean government applied the BIS ratio less stringently to savings
banks (capital adequacy ratio of 5%) than the commercial banking industry, which
was required to meet the BIS capital adequacy ratio of 8%. 96 This may be an
appropriate policy because commercial banks are much bigger in size and have more
diverse business models than savings banks. However, savings banks tried to create a
good capital adequacy ratio by selling subordinated bonds. 97 Because subordinated
bonds are counted as equity capital, but not liabilities, savings banks thoughtlessly
tried to sell the bonds to make it seem as if their capital adequacy ratio was
adequate. 98 Therefore, applying the BIS ratio to savings banks may not be effective
regulation.
More importantly, since the current savings bank crisis, the government has
tried to solve the crisis by persuading healthy and strong financial holding companies

94

Supra note 51, at 332–3.

95

Id. at 332.

96

See Lee, Sang-deok, What is the BIS Rate?,
http://www.igoodnews.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=36205.
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Supra note 5, at 8.
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Id.
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2012,

and savings banks to take over insolvent savings banks. 99 During this process, the
government provided several benefits to acquirers because most acquirers were
hesitant to take over insolvent financial institutions. 100 Governments can save public
funds if financial institutions take over failed banks instead. This is because as healthy
and strong financial institutions take over failed savings banks, the government does
not need to spend public funds to rescue insolvent banks. The Korean government
preferred this method of solving the crisis. However, this method may be mistaken
because acquirers still struggle to normalize poor savings banks and their future
remains in jeopardy. 101 Therefore, the attempt of the government to save insolvent
savings banks may cause a much bigger crisis in the future as the U.S. government
already experienced during the Savings and Loans Crisis of the 1980s. 102
F.

The Future of Korean Savings Banks
Savings banks have been providing financial services for low-income people

in Korea since the 1970s. 103 However, because commercial banking industries
perform very similar roles to savings banks, savings banks have faced several
problems in maintaining their businesses. 104 Also, since the savings bank crisis, the

99

Supra note 14, at 202–3.

100

See id.

101

Kang, supra note 9.

1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES−LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 186–7 (1997) (stating it was a bad solution for the U.S. government to bailout the insolvent
savings associations. If the government closed them instead, it could have spent much less than $160
billion).
102

103

See supra note 2.

104

See supra note 14, at 195. It states that the finance industry is typically divided into three parts in
Korea: banks, insurance, and financial investment (securities), and that commercial banks and savings
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savings bank industry is considered a poor financial institution. 105 In response, the
Korean government is trying to change savings banks’ title from savings banks back
to mutual credit unions. 106 If the title changes to mutual credit unions, the savings
bank industry would find it even harder to operate their business. 107
Because savings banks met difficulties in maintaining their businesses, they
tried to invest in high-risk, high-return ventures. 108 Several owners of savings banks
also tried to engage in high-risk and high-return investments, so they took advantage
of weak regulations and bribed savings bank regulators for less supervision. 109
Savings banks need to go back to basics and not invest in high-risk and high-return
ventures. 110 In addition, the savings bank industry needs to have its own regulation
and supervision so that the government can create a more sound and secure savings
bank system. 111

banks have almost identical businesses because savings and loans are the main businesses for both
institutions.
105

Jung, Hyun-soo, Savings Banks Restructuring Causes Else Victims, MONEYTODAY, Mar. 28, 2013,
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2013032714525710903&outlink=1.
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Title, MKNEWS, Sept. 24, 2012, http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2012&no=616267.
108

See supra note 14, at 195.

109

See supra note 80.

110

See supra note 63, at 151–3.

111

Id. at 150.
22

III. ORIGINS OF THE 1980S SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS
A.

Short Explanation of the Savings and Loan Crisis
Thrifts, mainly referring to savings and loan associations (S&Ls), gained a

significant portion of the U.S. financial industry by acquiring the largest share of
mortgage business among financial institutions despite the thrift crisis. 1 S&Ls receive
deposits and grant loans to local residents, including home financing loans. 2 The
thrift industry has therefore been serving the important role of providing financial
services to local residents and contributing to local home development. 3
One of the biggest financial crises, the Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L Crisis),
occurred in the U.S. during the 1980s. 4 Several causes contributed to the S&L Crisis
including: a harsh financial environment, deregulation, rapid growth, high-risk and
high-return investment, and regulatory forbearance. 5 This debacle had very serious
negative effects on the financial industry as well as the U.S. economy. 6 From 1980 to
1988, 560 thrifts failed, and there were 333 supervisory mergers and 798 voluntary
mergers. 7 The peak of the crisis occurred from 1981 to 1982 when 493 voluntary and

1

LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S & L DEBACLE 13 (1991).

2

Id. at 14.

3

1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 1.02[D] (2d ed. 2011).

4

Supra note 1, at 3.

5

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT,
ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 6–10 (1993).
6

JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 24 (1991).

1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES−LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 169 (1997).
7
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259 supervisory mergers took place for insolvent thrifts. 8 Moreover, the insurance
corporation for thrifts, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC),
was unable to appropriately resolve the crisis because it did not have enough fiscal
resources to handle the increasing number of insolvent thrifts. 9 Due to the crisis, the
FSLIC soon ran out of money. 10 As the above figures show, the S&L Crisis is
appropriately described as a disaster.
In order to solve the crisis, the U.S. government supported the FSLIC’s
attempt to decrease the number of insolvent thrifts by enacting the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987. 11 Despite the assistance, 250 thrifts were still
insolvent. 12 Beginning in 1989, the Bush administration tried resolving the crisis by
enacting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA). 13

Pursuant to these Acts, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)

and the FSLIC were abolished, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
became newly responsible for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the
Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). 14 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)

8

Id. at 168.

9

Supra note 1, at 135.

10

Supra note 7, at 173.

11

Id. at 186–188.

12

Id. at 186.

13

Id. at 187–188.

14

Id. at 188.
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was also created to regulate the thrift industry on behalf of the FHLBB. 15
B.

History of the Thrift Industry
The thrift industry consists of three institutions: savings banks, savings and

loan associations, and thrift holding companies. 16 Prior to 1980, only two savings
institutions existed: savings and loan associations and savings banks. 17 Interestingly,
most U.S. savings banks have been located on the East Coast unlike savings and loan
associations, which have been spread across the U.S. 18 The first savings banks were
established in both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts in 1816, and were created in
order to encourage savings. 19 A federal savings bank charter did not exist until
1978. 20 Two forms of savings banks exist: the mutual savings bank and the stock
savings bank. 21 The former is made up of depositors who serve as the board of
trustees, and who share in all of the bank’s profits. 22 Unlike mutual savings banks,
stock savings banks are corporations with stockholders serving as the board of

15

Robert Cooper, The Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S363 (1991).

16

DONALD J. TOUMEY, BASICS OF BANKING LAW 25–28, 39 (1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(1) (stating
that “savings association means (A) any Federal savings association; (B) any State savings association;
(C) any corporation (other than a bank) that the Board of Directors and the Comptroller of the Currency
jointly determine to be operating in substantially the same manner as a savings association”).

17

Supra note 1.

18

Supra note 3, at § 1.02[C].

19

LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 82
(4th ed. 2011).
20

Id.
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Supra note 3, at § 1.02[C].

22

Id.
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directors. 23 Prior to 1982, there were only state-chartered savings institutions, but
pursuant to the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, savings institutions
could be chartered under federal law as well. 24
Savings and loan associations make up the largest portion of the thrift
industry. 25 The first savings and loan association, the Oxford Provident Building
Association, was created in Frankford, Pennsylvania, in 1831. 26 The purpose of
savings and loan associations is to provide financial services for individuals, unlike
the commercial banking industry, which mainly provides financial services for
businesses. 27 At that time, savings associations in Frankford were geographically
limited to conducting business, such as offering mortgage loans, within five miles of
that area. 28 However, the growth of the thrift industry in the 1990s helped slacken the
geographic restriction. 29 Initially, savings institutions were also limited to mortgage
lending only, but after the deregulation of the thrift industry in the early 1980s,
savings institutions were able to provide various financial services in addition to
mortgage lending. 30 Similar to savings banks, savings and loan associations have

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at § 1.02[D].

26

Supra note 6, at 9.

27

Supra note 19, at 72.

28

Supra note 6, at 9.
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See id. at 11.

30

Supra note 3, at § 1.02[D].
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federally chartered and state-chartered associations. 31 Two forms of savings and loan
associations exist as well, mutual or stock. 32 Since 1980, mutual savings and loan
associations have tended to switch their form to stock because stock associations
could make greater profits, including public offerings of stock. 33
The main purpose of thrifts is to provide financial services to local residents
and to assist in housing market development. 34 As a result, residential mortgage loans
were the key part of the thrift industry, and comprised over two thirds of their total
assets. 35 Because savings institutions invested mostly in mortgage loans and needed
to follow the Qualified Thrift Lender (QTL) test, the thrift industry was vulnerable to
downturns in the housing market and economy. 36 Although the thrift industry
suffered from the harsh circumstances mentioned above, the industry is still needed
by financial consumers. 37
C.

Why Are Savings Institutions Needed?
Savings institutions promote savings and make loans to local residents for
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Id.
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Id.
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Supra note 6, at 10.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 33 (2009);
Morrison & Foerster, Thrift Institutions after Dodd-Frank: The New Regulatory Framework (Dec. 2011)
at 24, available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/111208-Thrift-Institutions-UserGuide.pdf (complying with the Qualified Thrift Lender (QTL) requires thrifts to invest at least 65
percent of their total assets in residential mortgage lending).
37

See supra note 1.
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homes, and therefore, thrifts promote local housing development. 38 The thrift
industry has likely played a significant role in promoting local home financing
because other financial institutions might have been unwilling to provide the service.
Unlike savings institutions, the commercial banking industry comprises the greatest
portion of the financial industry, but its main purpose is to provide financial services
to mid to large-sized companies. 39 The two government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), were established to stimulate
mortgage loans by purchasing mortgages from financial institutions. 40 However, the
GSEs may not be helpful for people who want to purchase a home, because the GSEs
have been under conservatorship since the mortgage crisis of 2008. 41
In addition, thrifts are necessary to promote competition in the financial
industry because in order to attract customers, each financial institution will provide
better and more convenient services to its customers. 42 If thrifts disappear,
commercial banks may exclusively provide financial services to local residents
placing higher rates and stricter requirements on loans. Small companies and local
residents may have trouble accessing financial services as big banks are often
38

See supra note 6, at 10 (stating that “the institution economized on information and transactions
costs by consolidating the savings of a group of local individuals and rechanneling the funds to the
same individuals in the form of home mortgage loans”).

39

BENTON E. GUP & JAMES W. KOLARI, COMMERCIAL BANKING: THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 8 (3rd ed.
2005).
40

Supra note 19, at 329.
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Id. at 330–331.

42

See id. at 204 (stating that “banks already are facing increasing competition from non-banks that
offer payment services that build upon the bank supplied payments system, but add features that
provide customers additional information, convenience, and timeliness”).
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criticized for rejecting loans to small local businesses. 43 Such rejections may have
adverse effects on the community as a whole, and this situation will worsen if thrifts
cease to exist.
D.

U.S. Financial Systems
1.

The Dual Banking System

The U.S. government has chosen the dual banking system, made up of federal
and state charters, since the Civil War. 44 With the dual banking system, financial
institutions can choose either a federal or state charter. 45 The purpose of the dual
banking system selected by the U.S. government is to promote a sound and safe
banking environment with competition between federal authority and state authority. 46
However, it has been argued whether the dual banking system is an appropriate
system for the U.S. 47 Due to countless overlaps between federal law and state law,
conflicts have arisen between these two systems. 48 In order to solve the overlap
problem, the U.S. government conferred primacy to federal financial institutions;

43

155 CONG. REC. H 14747, 14749 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (statement of Reps. Schauer).
Congressman Schauer from Michigan criticized that “big banks have decided to stop lending to
Michigan homeowners and Michigan businesses.” He also pointed out that “employers can’t get loan
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JONATHAN R. MACEY AT EL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 12 (3d ed. 2001); supra note 19, at 68
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30, 32 (2008).
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JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 120.
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federal law can preempt state law when federal law and state law conflict. 49 In
response, several financial institutions switched to the federal charter to take
advantage of the preemption rule. 50 However, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), preemption has been
removed except for three exceptions. 51
2.

U.S. Financial Regulatory System

Because the U.S. has the dual banking system, there are two regulatory
systems, federal and state. 52 There are also different regulatory structures for the
commercial banking industry, thrift industry, credit union, and others. 53 After many
crises, several Acts were passed to establish different regulatory agencies to foster a
strong and secure financial industry. 54

<Table 1> “Systemic Crises and the Creation of Financial Regulators” 55
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use the National Bank Act to preempt state laws”).
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Supervision, Congressional Research Service, Order Code R40249 (Dec. 14, 2009) at 4 (citing CRS).
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Various financial regulatory agencies charter, examine, and regulate the
commercial banking industry. 56 There are also different bank regulatory structures
depending on the bank organization. 57 First, the Office of the Comptrollers of the
Currency (OCC), the oldest federal regulator, is responsible for chartering and
regulating all national banks. 58 The OCC is a branch of the Treasury Department. 59
The President with Senate confirmation appoints the comptroller of the OCC, and his
or her term is for five years. 60 The OCC’s budget derives from assessment fees paid
by its regulated financial institutions.61 Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the OCC is
additionally responsible for regulating all federally chartered thrifts and has become
the rulemaking authority of all thrifts. 62
Next, the Federal Reserve System (FRS) consists of “a seven-member board
of governors, twelve regional Federal Reserve banks, and the Federal Open Market
Committee.” 63 The FRS is responsible for regulatory and monetary policies, and it
supervises the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB), all state-member banks, and bank
holding companies, including stipulating regulations for consumer protection. 64 One
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59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Carol Beaumier et al., Protiviti, U.S. Regulatory Reform – Impact on the Thrift Industry, available at
http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/POV/POV-US-Regulatory-Reform-Thrift.pdf.
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important function that the Federal Reserve Banks perform is that when financial
depository institutions need emergency funds, the institutions can borrow money from
the Banks as a last resort. 65 The central role of the Federal Open Market Committee
is to set monetary policy, and it “consist[s] of the seven members of the board of
governors and five Federal Reserve Bank presidents.” 66 The President not only
appoints the board members in the board of governors with Senate confirmation for
fourteen-year terms, but also nominates a member for a chair as the executive head of
the board. 67 The FRB earns interest from its government securities portfolio, and
covers its expenses by such earnings. 68 Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FRB has
additional authority to regulate thrift holding companies and non-depository
institution subsidiaries. 69
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) consists of a five-member
board of directors. One of the members is the comptroller of the OCC, and another is
the director of the OTS. 70 The remaining members are appointed by the President
with Senate confirmation for a six-year term. 71 The FDIC maintains a healthy
financial industry by insuring bank and thrift deposits, and by regulating state
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V. Gerard Comizio & Lawrence D. Kaplan, Paul Hastings, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Thrifts (July 2010) at 2, available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1665.pdf.
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nonmember banks. 72 The FDIC acts as a receiver or conservator of insolvent
financial institutions, and maintains its budget from the deposit insurance funds. 73
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the corporation is additionally responsible for
supervising and examining state thrift institutions. 74
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) consists of a chair and
two members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation for six-year terms,
and has the authority to charter and regulate federal credit unions, and federally
insured state credit unions, including implementing the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund. 75 The NCUA operates its own budget through the share insurance
fund. 76
In addition to the NCUA, each state has their own regulatory agencies, which
regulate and charter financial institutions.77 Last, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, a
new regulatory agency, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP), will
regulate only those financial institutions whose assets are over $10 billion. 78
Although the BCFP belongs to the FRB, the agency is independent. 79 The President
with Senate confirmation appoints an independent Director, who will be not only a

72

Id. at 71.

73

Id. at 71–2.

74

Supra note 69.

75

JONATHAN, supra note 46, at 72.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Supra note 19, at 370.

79

Id.
34

member of FSOC, but also on the board of directors of the FDIC. 80 The BCFP was
created to allow financial consumers to access “fair, transparent, and competitive
financial services and products,” and it is “funded by annual transfers from the
earnings of the Fed, rather than assessments from the regulated entities, and insulated
from the political appropriations process.” 81
3.

U.S. Financial Depository Institutions

Commercial banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions are three different
types of depository institutions in the U.S.82 Commercial banks are either federally or
state chartered, and serve various financial services to individuals and business
groups. 83 Thrift institutions are also classified as federal savings associations, state
savings associations, or thrift holding companies. 84 Thrifts were established to serve
financial services to residents in the housing market. 85 Credit Unions are also
federally or state chartered, and their main role is to make loans to its members. 86
E.

The Savings and Loan Crisis
1.

Causes of the S&L Crisis

(a) Economic circumstances
80

Id.

81

Id.
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DONALD, supra note 16, at 9–29.
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Id. at 9.
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Id. at 25–29.

85

Id. at 25.
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Id. at 29.
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As mentioned previously, the Savings and Loan Crisis was one of the biggest
financial crises in the U.S. 87 Several causes gave rise to the crisis, one being the
economic circumstances at the time. 88 Inflation caused the U.S. thrift industry to face
serious trouble during the 1970s. 89 The U.S. government increased interest rates in
order to overcome the inflation. 90 As a result, the thrift industry faced difficulties,
experiencing a serious imbalance between interest rates and balance sheets. 91
Because of the unique business structure of thrifts, including short-term deposits and
long-term mortgage loans with fixed interest rates, thrifts were vulnerable to the
inflation and to the rapid increase of interest rates. 92 This side effect of inflation had
the greatest impact on the thrift industry in 1980. 93
Thrifts also met business problems due to competition from other financial
institutions, including money market mutual funds (MMMFs), because the MMMFs
became more attractive than thrifts for investors. 94 The MMMFs could provide high
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Supra note 1, at 3.
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Robert J. Laughlin, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S301, S303
(1991); for a discussion of other factors that contributed to the S&L crisis see Carl Felsenfeld, The
Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S28 (1991).
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See Robert, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle at S303; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (9th
ed. 2009) (stating that inflation means: “A general increase in prices coinciding with a fall in the real
value of money”).
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Robert, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle at S304.
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Supra note 7, at 168.
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Supra note 1, at 53 (stating that “There was, however, one flaw in this pattern: Thrifts were taking in
short-term deposits but making long-term, fixed-interest-rate mortgage loan. If interest rates increased
significantly, they would be squeezed”); actually most S&Ls were insolvent in 1981 due to the unique
business, fixed-rate mortgage loan for long term and deposits for short term, supra note 6, at 38.
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Robert, supra note 88, at S304.
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interest rates on deposits, especially on large denomination Certificate Deposits (CDs),
without limitation because the Regulation Q ceilings did not cover the denomination
CDs. 95 Thus, investors could profit from the CDs. In order to attract investors and to
compete with the MMMFs, thrifts should have paid higher interest rates on deposits
than MMMFs. 96 The thrift industry faced operating losses, or lost their depositors to
the MMMFs. 97 In addition to these circumstances and the new competition, the thrift
industry is vulnerable to conditions of the housing market because thrifts must invest
at least 65% of their assets into residential mortgage lending. 98 With this limitation,
the thrift industry may face severe difficulties whenever the real estate market falls. 99
(b) Deregulation
Deregulation is also one of the significant reasons for the S&L Crisis.100
Because of the increased interest rates and competition, savings institutions had a hard
time operating their businesses. 101 In response to the difficulties facing the thrift
industry, the U.S. government relaxed regulations on the thrift industry in the hopes
that the industry would recover. 102 Deregulation policies were prevalent in the early

95

Id; The thrift industry was limited by the Fed to pay interest rates on deposits; thrifts could not serve
higher interest rates on deposits than the MMMFs did. See NED EICHLER, THE THRIFT DEBACLE 23
(1989).
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1980s. 103 First, the FHLBB eased capital requirements for thrifts from five percent to
four percent in 1980, and then to three percent in 1982. 104 Because the government
reduced the capital requirement, thrifts could avoid being insolvent. 105 In addition to
the low capital requirement, the FHLBB allowed thrifts to use two accounting
principles to give the appearance that thrifts were solvent. 106 The first principle that
thrifts could abuse was the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 107 By
abusing the GAAP, thrifts could show they were sound, safe, and profitable despite
the fact that they were insolvent. 108 Another principle was regulatory accounting
principles (RAP), which enabled thrifts to pretend that they had assets although the
assets were already sold at a giveaway price. 109 In short, the FHLBB took advantage
of these two principles to overstate the condition of broke thrifts, but this exaggeration
could not last long. 110
Following the deregulation policy, the U.S. government enacted two Acts, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)
and the Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn–St Germain) to
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profitable”).
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assist the troubled thrift industry. 111 DIDMCA lowered net worth requirements of
insured accounts by substituting three to six percent for the existing five percent. 112
Actually, the FHLBB had authority to determine the percentage pursuant to the Act. 113
DIDMCA also eliminated limitations so that thrifts could provide liberal interest rates
on deposits by phasing out the Regulation Q. 114 Pursuant to the Act, thrifts could start
providing the negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW) account. 115 Significantly,
DIDMCA increased the amount of deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 to
attract depositors. 116 However, this increased deposit insurance led thrifts to pursue
high-risk and high-return investments because even if thrifts went bankrupt, the
FSLIC could protect each customer’s deposit up to $100,000. 117
The thrift industry was given more powers under the Garn–St Germain; the
Act allowed thrifts to pursue non-traditional investments. 118 This Act also granted
priority to thrift-holding companies if they had conflicts with other laws when taking

111

Supra note 7, at 175.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Supra note 19, at 99.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117
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over insolvent thrifts. 119 Both DIDMCA and the Garn–St Germain gave authority to
state-chartered thrifts to operate as federally chartered thrifts did. 120 Also, thrifts
began engaging in various activities that traditionally only commercial banks could
engage in. 121 The two Acts allowed thrifts to rapidly expand their investment by
eliminating the interest rates on deposits. 122 These Acts enabled thrifts to pursue
high-risk and high-return investments causing moral hazard by raising the coverage of
the deposit insurance. 123
The FHLBB also removed limitations with respect to ownership
requirements. 124 With the elimination of restrictions, swindlers could readily become
owners of thrifts. 125 Furthermore, the Reagan administration eased the regulatory
environment on the thrift industry by lessening the size of regulatory agencies and by
reducing intervention on the industry. 126 Regulators and supervisors for thrifts were
not of the same quality as regulators and supervisors for the commercial banking
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Id. (noting that the activities include “checking accounts, nonresidential real estate loans,
nonmortgage consumer loans [including credit card loans], commercial loans, and the ability to
exercise trust and fiduciary powers”).
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industry. 127 Regulators for thrifts received twenty to thirty percent less wages than the
commercial banking regulators as well. 128 The FHLBB cut the number of supervisors
and regulators for the thrift industry from 1981 to 1984. 129 In addition, both
examinations and examinations per billion dollars of assets on the thrift industry
dropped sequentially between 1980 and 1984. 130 As we can see from the tables below,
a lack of regulation and supervision took place during this period while the assets of
thrifts increased. 131 This inverse relationship significantly aggravated the poor
condition of the thrift industry. 132
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<Table 2> “FHLBB Regulatory Resources, 1979-1984” 133
Examination

and Examination

Supervision Staff

Supervision

and
Budget

(millions)
1979

1,282

$41.0

1980

1,308

$49.8

1981

1,385

$52.8

1982

1,379

$57.3

1983

1,368

$62.5

1984

1,337

$67.0

<Table 3> “FSLIC-Insured Thrift Examinations, 1980-1984” 134
Examinations

Number

of Thrift

Examinations

Examinations

per Thrift

per

FSLIC-

Industry

Insured

Assets

Dollars

Thrifts

(billions)

Assets

1980

3,210

3,993

$593.8

5.41

1981

3,171

3,751

$639.8

4.96

1982

2,800

3,287

$686.2

4.08

1983

2,131

3,146

$813.8

2.62

1984

2,347

3,136

$976.9

2.40

133

Id (citing Barth and Bradley (1989)).

134

Id. at 89 (citing FHLBB date; Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1989)).
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Billion
of

(c) Increased Deposit Insurance
The deposit insurance system was created in the 1930s to maintain sound and
safe conditions for financial markets, and to protect depositors. 135 During the Great
Depression, the Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) mainly for the commercial banking industry, and the National
Housing Act of 1934 established the FSLIC for the thrift industry. 136 However, thrifts
deliberately abused the deposit insurance system not only to pursue high-risk
investments, but also to charm depositors because their deposits were protected by
insurance. 137 With the deposit insurance, thrifts engaged in high-risk and high-return
investment by relying on insurance guarantees when they became insolvent. 138 In the
1980s, the U.S. government increased the amount of the deposit insurance from
$40,000 to $100,000, enabling thrifts to hold significant amounts of capital to sharply
grow their businesses. 139 If thrifts did not have the deposit insurance, they might not
have engaged in high-risk and high-return investments. 140 Also, without the
insurance, the S&L crisis might not have happened. 141
(d) Moral Hazard
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Moral hazard by managers or directors of thrifts is considered another reason
for the S&Ls crisis. 142 Moral hazard is defined as “the incentives that insured
institutions have to engage in higher-risk activities than they would without deposit
insurance; deposit insurance means, as well, that insured depositors have no
compelling reason to monitor the institution’s operations.” 143 In the 1980s,
deregulation and increased deposit insurance enabled directors and managers of thrifts
to pursue high-risk and high-return investments.

144

During this period, the

government eased the restriction of ownership on savings institutions by removing a
restriction that required savings institutions to keep at least 400 shareholders, at least
125 of which had to be local residents of the location of the savings institution.145
Also, one shareholder could not own more than ten percent of the total shares of a
savings institution, or one group could not own more than twenty-five percent of the
shares. 146 However, after removing these restrictions, one person could own shares of
savings institutions without any limitation. 147 Removing these restrictions eventually
allowed a shareholder to engage in illegal activities and bankrupt his or her savings
institutions.148 In this sense, without deregulation and increased deposit insurance,
moral hazard may not have happened at all. Moral hazard and lax regulations,
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combined with increased coverage of deposit insurance, allowed thrifts to rapidly
develop the industry into nontraditional activities, compared to previous years, which
may have worsened the situation. 149

149

Supra note 1, at 102, 106 (stating that: “Rapid growth by any business enterprise is likely to involve
management and organizational problems; thrifts are no exception”).
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<Table 4> “Holdings of “Nontraditional” Assets by FSLIC-Insured Thrifts, 1982
and 1985” 150
1982

1982

1985

1985

1985

Amount

Percentage

Amount

Percentage

Increase in

(billions)

of

(billions)

of

Total Assets

Assets

Total Amount,
1982–1985
(billions)

Commercial

$43.9

6.4%

$98.4

9.2%

$54.5

Land loans

6.9

1.0

31.0

2.9

24.1

Commercial

0.7

0.1

16.0

1.5

15.2

19.2

2.8

43.9

4.1

24.7

1.2

26.8

2.5

18.6

11.5%

$216.1

20.2%

$137.2

Mortgage
loans

loans
Consumer
loans
Direct equity 8.2
investments
Total

$78.9

(e) Delayed Policy & Mergers
After the S&L Crisis, the U.S. government encouraged healthy institutions to

150

Id. at 102 (citing Barth, Bartholomew, and Labich (1989)).
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take over failed institutions in order to mitigate the crisis, but this method caused a
much bigger outcome in which “the final cost of resolving failed S&Ls is estimated at
just over $160 billion, including $132 billion from federal taxpayers —and much of
this cost could have been avoided if the government had had the political will to
recognize its obligation to depositors in the early 1980s, rather than viewing the
situation as an industry bailout.” 151 If the government had closed the failed
institutions instead of merging them with other prime institutions, it would have
avoided these massive costs. 152 In other words, the government could have avoided
spending public funds to resolve the crisis. 153 One reason for the merger policy was
that the FSLIC had insufficient resources to close insolvent thrifts, and most
congressmen trusted that bankrupt thrifts would recover with deregulation. 154
Therefore, the U.S. government might have preferred the mergers rather than closing
insolvent thrifts in order to save public funds and insufficient resources. However, the
merger policy might not have been the correct decision in light of another crisis faced
by mutual savings banks (MSBs). 155 The FDIC, the insurance corporation for MSBs,
was able to minimize damages by promptly closing failed MSBs. 156
2.

Result of the S&L Crisis
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The S&L Crisis was one of the biggest crises in U.S. banking history. 157 This
crisis resulted in massive damages, including the insolvency of the thrift industry, the
establishment of new statutes and regulatory systems, countless victims, and huge
expenditures of public funds. 158 Between 1980 and 1988, the number of savings and
loan associations decreased by more than 1,000, and almost 5,000 S&Ls were
insolvent; even the insurance corporation for S&Ls recorded deficits. 159 During this
period, there were more than 560 failed S&Ls, and more than 1,000 S&Ls were
acquired through both supervisory and voluntary mergers. 160 More than $160 billion
was used to resolve the S&Ls crisis. 161 Lastly, existing regulatory agencies and
insurance corporations were abolished, and the Bush administration enacted the
FIRREA, which abolished the FHLBB and the FSLIC, and gave new authority to the
FDIC over the thrift industry. 162 In addition, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
was established to regulate the whole thrift industry. 163
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IV. EXAMPLES OF HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE THRIFT
INDUSTRY
Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act increased
regulatory standards for all financial institutions, including thrifts. 1 The increased
regulations include a higher capital requirement, new regulatory agencies, the QTL
test, and the OTC derivatives. 2 It has been asked whether the increased regulatory
standards will adversely affect thrifts. 3
The thrift industry was originally limited by regulations that prevented it from
diversifying and dealing with large businesses, as its main purpose is to provide
residential mortgage loans to residents.

4

Limitations preventing thrifts from

expanding their business probably seemed appropriate in the 1960s because the thrift
industry controlled about seventy-five percent of all home mortgage business. 5
However, today’s thrift industry occupies less than twenty-five percent of the market,
and given this changed condition, regulatory limitations may give rise to serious
problems for the thrift industry. 6 If thrifts receive more intensive regulation,

1

PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on Thrifts & Thrift Holding Companies 1 (2011) (stating that the thrift
industry will face more serious difficulty than any other financial institution due to the Dodd-Frank
Act).
2

Id. at 2–9.

3
See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES
129 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that “It remains to be seem, however, whether the OCC will retain
regulations that preserve the distinct character of federal savings associations, or whether those
associations will voluntarily convert to a national bank charter”; “it also remains to be seen whether the
OCC will issue or organizers will seek any new federal savings association charters”).
4

Id. at 130.

5

Supra note 1, at 2.
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See id.
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including more limitations, there may not be any way for the industry to survive, let
alone prosper. This may cause thrifts to disappear as they convert to banking charters
to get more general lending powers. 7
A.

Higher Capital Requirement
After the crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act started treating the thrift industry

almost equal to the banking industry with respect to regulations, including capital
requirements. 8 This is because the more capital a financial institution has, the better
they can buffer against unexpected financial difficulties. 9 Greater capital creates safer
alternatives to deal with sudden problems. 10 On the other hand, the higher capital
requirement may give rise to difficulties for the thrift industry. In addition to the
regulations that prevent thrifts from having diverse business models, the increased
capital requirement may cause the industry to lose existing business. 11
In general, requiring higher capital can prevent financial institutions from
expanding their assets. 12 The higher capital requirement will give competitive
disadvantages to financial institutions, and cause them to fall behind their

7

Supra note 3, at 118.

8

See supra note 1, at 8.

9

See id.

10

BENTON E. GUP & JAMES W. KOLARI, COMMERCIAL BANKING: THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 345 (3rd
ed. 2005).
11

See id. at 359 (opposing regulator’s view about capital requirements on financial institutions, and
arguing that financial institutions need more capital like debts to invest to increase profits or increase
their stock’s value).
12

Id. at 347.
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competitors.

13

The thrift industry is unlikely to be an exception to these

disadvantages.
After the crisis, the U.S. government put more intensive regulations on the
financial industry through the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the government should have
acted more fairly when it placed the increased capital requirements on both the
banking industry and the thrift industry. Although smaller financial institutions
traditionally face more intensive capital requirements than larger financial institutions,
there is no evidence that smaller institutions pose a greater failure risk than bigger
ones. 14 More equitable regulations are needed that are based on the unique
circumstance and character of each financial institution. The government should
consider each unique characteristic first, and then decide how best to regulate thrifts.
The thrift industry operates under completely different circumstances than the
banking industry, such as the QTL test and scales of assets, so that if thrifts face
similar regulations to banks, thrifts may be disadvantaged. 15 Even prior to the DoddFrank Act, the QTL test caused more than forty thrifts to go bankrupt between 2007
and 2009. 16 The new international capital standard under Basel III 17 may lead thrifts

13

Id. at 348.

14

Id. at 347–8.

15

See supra note 1, at 2.

16

Id (stating that “While Congress relaxed regulations on thrifts in the 1980s to allow them to operate
more like banks, especially at the community bank level, thrifts are still required to maintain at least 65
percent of their assets in home mortgages and other forms of retail lending, in order to meet the
qualified thrift lender test”; “not surprisingly given this asset concentration, over 40 thrifts failed during
2007-2009, including the largest, Washington Mutual, with $300 billion in assets”).

17

Basel III is defined as “a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking
sector,” and “these measures aim to: improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from
51

to convert to bank charters due to the increased risk-based and leverage capital
requirements. 18 Thrift-holding companies may also suffer because of the Collins
Amendment that treats thrift holding companies almost the same as bank holding
companies. 19 In this sense, more intensive capital requirements set by the Basel III
may cause the thrift industry to disappear.
B.

The Qualified Thrift Lender (QTL) Test
The Qualified Thrift Lender test (QTL) was established to provide residential

mortgage services to local residents through the thrift industry. 20 Thus, the thrift
industry was able to occupy a substantial part of the total mortgage market. 21
However, the QTL test prevents thrifts from developing and causes thrifts to
disappear. 22 Given these reasons, it has been periodically argued whether thrifts are
needed and whether the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) should be merged into the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 23
The QTL test may also cause a thrift crisis whenever the housing market falls

financial and economic stress, whatever the source; improve risk management and governance;
strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.” International regulatory framework for banks (Basel
III), BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
18

Halah Touryalai, New Fed Rules Will Kill Thrift Banks, FORBES, June 11, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/06/11/new-fed-rules-will-kill-thrift-banks-kbw-says/.
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KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY
FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 175 (2011). To comply with the QTL test, thrifts must invest 65 percent of
their total assets into residential mortgage lending business.
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because thrifts must invest sixty-five percent of their total assets in predominately
residential mortgage loans. 24 This test does not seem appropriate anymore because
although thrifts occupied more than two thirds of the mortgage lending business in the
1960s, today they control less than twenty-five percent of the total mortgage lending
business. 25 This test is also responsible for causing several thrifts to become insolvent
during the financial crisis of 2008. 26
The Dodd-Frank Act leaves the QTL test intact although the Act places
additional intensive regulations on the thrift industry. 27 Given that the thrift industry
takes less than one fourth of total mortgage lending business, the QTL test should be
changed in order for the thrift industry to survive. 28 Under current circumstances, it is
doubtful whether the test is still needed for the thrifts.
C.

Changed Regulatory System
1.

Changed Regulation of the Thrift Industry

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, more intensive and stringent rules and regulations

24

See id. at 174.

25

Supra note 1, at 2.

26

Id.

27

V. Gerard Comizio & Lawrence D. Kaplan, Paul Hastings, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: Impact on Thrifts (July 2010) at 5, available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1665.pdf; The U.S. government through the DoddFrank Act provides the CFPB mortgage loan regulation as an effective change for thrifts by giving
several exemptions and adjustments under which thrifts can lessen their burden complying with
regulations. Despite of the effective change, the QTL test still seems to be huge burden for thrifts to
comply with. See Summary of the Final Mortgage Servicing Rules 1, CONSUMER FINANCE PROTECTION
BUREAU, Jan. 17, 2013, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201301_cfpb_servicing-rules_summary.pdf.
28

See supra note 1, at 2.
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will be created compared to the previous supervisions conducted by the OTS. 29 It is
expected that thrift examinations by the OCC, the FRB, and the FDIC will be more
complex and strict because the OCC will treat small-size thrifts as community
banks. 30 The OCC also treats mid-size and large-size thrifts as commercial banks,
and the FRB imposes the same level of regulation on thrift holding companies as they
do on bank holding companies. 31 Therefore, thrift industries will be subject to the
same level of regulation as the banking industry. 32 However, applying more stringent
regulations equally to all financial institutions without considering each financial
institution’s unique character and business model may create confusion in the
financial market. Imposing stronger regulations like capital requirements on all
financial institutions may not bring about optimal results. 33
While more stringent regulations will be imposed on thrifts than before, there
are also old regulations that thrifts are subject to, such as the QTL rule. 34 The QTL
rule makes thrifts more vulnerable to downturns in the housing market than

29

Dwight C. Smith et al., Morrison & Foerster, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: Future for Thrift Institutions (Mar. 2011) at 3, available at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110331-User-Guide-Thrift-Institutions.pdf (stating that
“the basic examination and supervision goals remain unchanged, but the day-to-day functions will be
different—and likely more intense.”).
30

Supra note 1, at 2.

31

Id. at 2, 8.

32

Carol Beaumier et al., Protiviti, U.S. Regulatory Reform – Impact on the Thrift Industry, available at
http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/POV/POV-US-Regulatory-Reform-Thrift.pdf (also stating,
“thrifts will likely find that other federal bank regulators take a broader and more intensive and critical
approach to regulatory examinations, particularly in areas outside of residential lending, such as
commercial banking, fiduciary operations and investment activities”).
33

Louis Massard, A Review of the New Financial Deal by David Skeel, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 435,
436 (2012).
34

Gerard, supra note 27.
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commercial banks. 35 Moreover, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, thrifts that fail the
QTL test will now face harsh consequences, like the elimination of a grace period for
compliance. 36
2.

Comparison between the Dodd-Frank Act & GAO’s Recommendations
(a) Consolidation of Regulatory Agencies

The Dodd-Frank Act does not include some elements suggested by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to achieve the most effective and efficient
financial regulatory system. 37 Although the Dodd-Frank Act tried to consolidate U.S.
regulatory systems by removing the OTS and by merging OTS’s role and authority
into existing and new federal regulatory agencies, a turf battle may nonetheless
result. 38 Unlike the pre-Dodd Frank era when the OTS was responsible for the
supervision and examination of thrift industries, four regulatory agencies (the OCC,
the FDIC, the FRB, and the BCFP) are now responsible for thrift regulation. 39 The
existence of multiple agencies that supervise and examine thrifts may lead to
competition between the OCC and the FDIC in an attempt to maintain their respective
regimes.

35

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 32 (2009).

36
Gerard, supra note 27 (stating, “the Dodd-Frank Act increased the consequences for failing the QTL
test”).
37

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
(2009).
38

Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, Preemption, and the State Role
in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 171, 174 (2011).

39

Alexander H. Modell, IX. Transfer of Powers to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Corporation,
and the Board of Governors, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 562, 562–573 (2011).
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One of the GAO’s suggestions is the consolidation of regulators. 40 In the
U.S., it is still possible for financial institutions to choose either a federal charter or a
state charter. 41 This charter option causes “regulatory arbitrage, in which institutions
take advantage of variations in how agencies implement regulatory responsibilities in
order to be subject to less scrutiny.” 42 The multiple regulatory agencies of the thrift
industry seem to contradict the GAO’s finding, and even the purpose of the DoddFrank Act (to consolidate regulatory systems). The federal and state charter option
may result in very confusing circumstances in the thrift industry.
(b) Independence from Regulated Institution
As mentioned above, four federal regulatory agencies are now responsible for
supervising and regulating the thrift industry. According to a study of OTS’s operating
budget, the OTS in the past received assessment fees from its regulated institutions.43
OTS’s budget mostly came from these assessments. 44 The OCC’s operating budget
also comes from its regulated institutions. 45 Because both regulatory agencies’ budget
is derived largely from their regulated institutions, the agencies may not be
independent from the financial institutions they supervise. According to the GAO’s

40

Supra note 37, at 55.

41

Id (stating, “under the current U.S. system, financial institutions often have several options for how
to operate their business and who will be their regulator”).
42
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(2011).
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Id.
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recommendation, regulatory agencies should be independent from their regulated
institutions so that the agencies can appropriately regulate and supervise institutions
without considering assessments. 46
However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not address the problem of independence.
The Dodd-Frank Act still allows the OCC to receive assessments from its regulated
institutions. 47 In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act also lets the FRB and the FDIC
receive assessments from regulated institutions unlike before. 48 This new provision
may impose a greater economic burden of having to pay examination fees to
regulators. 49 As long as regulatory agencies are not independent from their regulated
institutions, the regulatory system remains untrustworthy. Regulatory agencies will
continue to be dependent on the regulated institutions even after the Dodd-Frank Act.
(c)

Differentiated Levels of Regulation for Different Financial

Institutions based on Risk-Based Criteria
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, new regulatory agencies are responsible for
supervising and examining the thrift industry. 50 Because the OCC is responsible for
federally chartered thrifts, thrifts may have trouble adjusting to the new regulator and
complying with new regulations set by the OCC. 51 As mentioned above, the OCC
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See id.
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Gerard, supra note 27, at 4.
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See id.
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51

Id.
57

will regulate thrifts based on size, so small thrifts will be regulated as community
banks. 52 Also, mid and large-size thrifts will be regulated as commercial banks by the
OCC. 53 However, commercial banks and thrifts, or community banks and thrifts have
unique characteristics and business types; thus, problematic issues may arise. Because
the OCC has been working for the commercial banking industry, it is expected that
the OCC will treat thrifts as commercial banks in many regulatory aspects. 54 Also,
the OCC does not use OTS’s suggested method of regulating and supervising thrifts. 55
The FRB also treats savings and loan holding companies as bank holding companies
for examination and supervision purposes under the Dodd-Frank Act. 56
However, according to the GAO’s recommendation, “a regulatory system
should ensure that similar institutions, products, and services posing similar risks are
subject to consistent regulation, oversight, and transparency.” 57 The recommendation
also states that different regulation should be applied to financial institutions that pose
different risks to the financial system, even though the financial institutions seem
similar. 58 If new regulatory agencies do not create differentiated regulations for the
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Law Reports, Aug. 2011), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/5064ffd8-e6f6-44b1-b223e664f0ee47c6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c7adf431-6f84-4e1f-81a4ea980cc173d5/macdonald%20schwartz%20after%20the%20ots.pdf.
55

Id.

56

V. Gerard Comizio et al., Paul Hastings, Time for a Change – the Thrift Charter and Strategic
Considerations
for
Conversion
(Feb.
2011)
at
2,
available
at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1839.pdf.
57

Supra note 37, at 60.

58

Id.
58

thrift industry, thrifts may face serious problems surviving. As suggested by the GAO,
differentiated regulations are needed.
(d) Over the Counter (OTC) Derivatives
The Dodd-Frank Act sets new regulations on Over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives, which are very controversial and created significant debates among
congressmen. 59 The purpose of the regulation is to “promote greater transparency and
to moderate systemic risks in order to minimize the recurrence of operational stresses
and excessive risk taking perceived by Congress to have occurred through OTC
derivatives activities, and which contributed to the 2007-09 financial crisis.” 60
However, people who oppose the regulation argue that the swaps trading did not
actually contribute to the financial crisis of 2008. 61
Regarding the OTC derivatives, the Act sets new requirements on the thrift
industry. First, thrifts or thrift holding companies have to register either Swap Dealers
(SD) or Major Swap Participants (MSP); second, the thrift industry must comply with
the Push-Out Amendment, called the Lincoln Amendment. 62 After registering as
either SD or MSP, the thrift industry has to comply with more requirements. 63 These

59

Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Clients & Friends Memo, The Lincoln Amendment: Banks,
Swap Dealers, National Treatment and the Future of the Amendment 2 (Dec. 2010) (there was no
contribution to the mortgage crisis by the swap trading business).
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PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on OTC Derivatives Activities 1 (Aug. 2010).
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Supra note 1, at 8.
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Supra note 60, at 3 (stating that “Dodd-Frank mandates certain studies of capital adequacy and
imposes capital requirements on swap dealers and MSPs in an effort to better understand and mitigate
the systemic risk of derivatives markets”; “Swap dealers and MSPs will be subject to new minimum
capital standards that are to be comparable to those applicable to banks, and with comparatively higher
59

requirements include, “reporting, recordkeeping, business conduct, collateral
management, capital, liquidity, and margin standards.” 64
First, thrifts and thrift holding companies must register as SD or MSP through
the CFTC or SEC, and acting as SD or MSP without registering is explicitly forbidden
under the Act. 65 However, the Act applies this requirement to all financial institutions
without considering the unique condition and character of each one. In order to
become SD or MSP, applicants have to comply with several requirements, such as
capital requirements, margin requirements, and various duties. 66 By doing so, the
thrift industry faces increased regulatory burdens as it is forced to deal with additional
regulatory agencies (CFTC and SEC) and regulations. 67 The new regulatory system
may increase compliance costs, and make it harder for thrifts or thrift holding
companies to continue operating their businesses. On the regulators’ side, registration
acts as a method of ensuring safe and sound swaps, but for thrifts or holding
companies, the burden of compliance may seem excessive. 68
In addition to SD and MSP registrations, thrifts or holding companies are also
required to comply with the push-out amendment, which prevents insured depository

counterparty capital charges for non-cleared derivatives activities”).
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PWC, A Closer Look, Impact on Dealers and Major Swap Participants 1 (Jan. 2011).
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See supra note 60, at 3; PWC, A Closer Look, Implications of Derivatives Regulation and Changing
Market Infrastructure for Nonfinancial Companies 2 (July 2011) (stating, “Companies with significant
swap activities could face enhanced registration requirements and ongoing regulation”; “New
recordkeeping and reporting requirements are intended to increase transparency for all participants and
allow regulators to better monitor risks and potential market manipulation”).
60

institutions from acting as swap dealers and leads institutions to push out swap
activities to nonfinancial affiliates. 69 Complying with the amendment may result in
negative outcomes because swaps dealers may not receive federal assistance,
including Federal Reserve credit facility and FDIC insurance. 70 There are two
alternatives that require thrifts or holding companies “to bifurcate their swaps desk
between interest swaps and other bank eligible swaps, which may remain in the bank
or branch, and all other swaps, which much be pushed to the holding company or
another affiliate; or to push their entire swaps desks into holding company or
affiliate.” 71
There are many reasons why the alternatives may adversely affect the thrift
industry. 72 Pushing swaps activities into nonfinancial affiliates may make their
customers uncomfortable because they have to deal with divided entities of a thrift
holding company (either a holding company or its affiliate). 73 This alternative also
may take netting privileges away from their customers. 74 Accordingly, customers
may find a much smaller entity, which may be exempt from the requirement but less
creditworthy, to deal with swaps activities. 75 Thrift holding companies may have to

69

Supra note 59 (Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act forbids financial institutions from becoming
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divide swaps activities into interest swaps and other thrift eligible swaps. 76 This
requirement not only costs more, but also places greater capital requirements on
thrifts. 77 In this sense, the legislation and compliance requirements may negatively
affect thrifts and thrift holding companies.

76

Id. at 7.

77

Id. at 8 (stating, “(T)he former alternative would require the bank holding company to conduct all of
its swaps desk activities outside the bank in an entity that typically carries a much higher internal cost
of funds, and to maintain a large pool of capital – separate from the capital maintained at the bank – in
order to support the pushed-out swap dealing activities”).
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V. HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT MAY NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE THRIFT INDUSTRY
Since the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, the number of thrifts in
operation has been steadily decreasing. 1 The main purpose of thrifts is to accept
deposits from local residents, make loans to local people, and promote a community’s
housing market. 2 However, as other financial institutions such as commercial banks
and non-banking mortgage lenders get more involved in the mortgage lending
business, thrifts may lose their unique standing in the mortgage lending industry. 3
Following the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act 4 was enacted to
promote a sound and secure financial system, and includes measures to protect
financial consumers. 5 However, the Act focuses more on preventing a future crisis, at
the expense of caring less about the different characteristics of the market players in
the financial industry. Thus, it is possible that the Dodd-Frank Act might kill the thrift
industry by creating a too heavy regulatory burden.
A.

How the Dodd-Frank Act Impacts Community Banks
After major crises, the conventional response of the U.S. legislature has been

1

OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, 2010 FACT BOOK: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE THRIFT INDUSTRY
5 (June 2011).
2

Halah Touryalai, New Fed Rules Will Kill Thrift Banks, FORBES, June 11, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/06/11/new-fed-rules-will-kill-thrift-banks-kbw-says/.

3

See id. (stating that following the Dodd-Frank Act, thrifts would be disappear, and commercial banks
and non-bank mortgage lenders would occupy the mortgage lending business instead).

4

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
5

Tanya D. Marsh & Adjunct Scholar American Enterprise Institute, Regulatory Burdens: The Impact
of Dodd Frank on Community Banking 1, 9 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
July 18, 2013).
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to propose strong regulations in order to prevent future damages. 6 The Dodd-Frank
Act is no exception as it puts more emphasis on regulatory systems. 7 Small-scaled
financial institutions may find it difficult to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. 8 It has
already been shown how the Act adversely affects smaller banks, especially
community banks. 9 It is important to analyze how community banks are negatively
affected by the Act because community banks and thrifts share many similarities. 10
It will be difficult for community banks to operate their businesses and
comply with the Dodd-Frank Act because they will likely face greater compliance
costs that will make it difficult to compete with larger banks. 11 Under the Act,
community banks will also be required to provide standardized products and forms.12
Complying with the Act requires increased standardization, and therefore may hurt
financial consumers, including low-income people, because they may not be eligible

6

Id. at 4–5 (stating that “the American system of banking regulation is a system of regulation by
accretion – it is the result of legislative responses to particular crises, from the need to create a market
for U.S. national bonds to help finance the Civil War, which led to the creation of national bank
charters, the creation of the Federal Reserve after the monetary panic of 1907, the creation of the FDIC
following the stock market crash of 1929, and Dodd-Frank after the 2007 financial crisis,” and “each of
these legislative efforts was a well-meaning attempt to deal with the perceived problems that led to
each crisis”).
7

See Christopher Brown, “Community Banks: Paper Delivered at Fed Conference Argues For TwoTiered Bank Regulatory System,” 101 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 556 (Oct. 4, 2013).

8

Louise Bennetts, Thanks to Dodd-Frank, Community Banks Are Too Small to Survive, AMERICAN
BANKER, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/thanks-to-dodd-frank-communitybanks-too-small-too-survive-1054241-1.html.
9

Supra note 5, at 2 (regulatory burdens on community banks following the Dodd-Frank Act will
ultimatley cause not only a demise of the community banking industry, but also a boom for huge banks
only; low-income or unbanked people will struggle to access financial services. The Act will eventually
lead to worse situations for both financial consumers and the U.S. economy).
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For more information about similarities between thrifts and community banks, see infra pp. 66–67.
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Supra note 7.
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to borrow money from community banks due to their credit status. 13 Smaller banks
have a much simpler and more limited business model and scale than bigger banks do,
and, therefore, they have unique strategies to serve financial products that bigger
banks do not. 14 However, under the Dodd-Frank Act, smaller banks would be unable
to provide such services and would lose their unique advantages over bigger banks. 15
In this sense, the Dodd-Frank Act would give rise to several problems by putting a lot
of pressure on community banks, and by preventing low-income people from having
access to financial services.
Community banks, consumers, and even the economy will suffer by
complying with the Dodd-Frank Act because community banks will lose their
consumers due to more standardized products, and consumers will look for other
financial institutions to borrow money, and will face higher interest fees. 16 This may
lead to a worsening of the economy where community banks become insolvent, and
consumers have increased debt obligations. Even though there is no doubt that the
Dodd-Frank Act is needed for fostering a sound and safe financial system, protecting
financial consumers, and preventing the “too big to fail” mentality, the Act comes

13

Id.

14
Id (stating, “the push to standardize the banking industry thus threatens access to credit for
underserved communities, and threatens the competitive position of community banks, which thrive in
part because they offer something that the larger banks cannot: flexibility based on local knowledge”).
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across as over-regulation. 17 Smaller banks, including community banks, have
relatively smaller systemic risks than larger banks, but both will face similar levels of
regulation. 18 If so, smaller banks may not be able to afford compliance with the overregulation. 19
The Dodd-Frank Act is too complex to be understood by community banks’
regular employees, so banks will need to hire experts to guide them through the
compliance process. 20 During this process, community banks will incur compliance
costs. 21 There are also complicated regulatory systems based on the dual banking
system of federal and state regulators and regulations. 22 These complex systems
create even more compliance costs for the community banking industry. 23
B.

Several Similarities between Thrifts and Community Banks
Although community banks and thrifts are different kinds of financial

17
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2013,
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&wsn=496889000&searchid=21413312&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=BDLN
WB&pg=0 (mentioning that community banks will receive almost the same level of regulation that has
applied to commercial banks).
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Banks After Dodd-Frank 2 (Working Paper Series, Oct. 1, 2013) (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act is
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See Christopher (stating that small banks have to shoulder more compliance costs than big banks
after new regulations were introduced, including “learning the requirements of a regulation, reviewing
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examination that results in significant compliance costs, and the system is too complex and too costly
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institutions, they share many characteristics in common. First, both financial
institutions are minority depository institutions with fewer assets than commercial
banking institutions. 24 Their roles are very significant for communities even though
they are minority institutions. 25 Next, both community banks and thrifts have much
smaller and more limited business models than big banks do, which serve various
kinds of financial services without limitations on geographic diversification. 26 Also,
community banks and thrifts provide financial services that big banks do not. 27 To be
successful, smaller banks need to be friendly in working with their local community.28
Last, they usually do not have experts and lawyers to assist with regulatory
compliance. 29

C.

Hypothetical Cases: How Thrifts Are Affected by the Dodd-Frank Act
After analyzing how the Dodd-Frank Act adversely affects community banks,

it may be possible to predict what will happen to the thrift industry under the Act.
When the mortgage crisis happened, larger thrifts, including the biggest thrifts in the
nation, went insolvent. 30 Washington Mutual Bank, Indy Mac, Golden West Financial,

24
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and Downey Savings & Loan were among the insolvent thrifts during the crisis. 31
There were several reasons why they became insolvent, including inappropriate
regulations by the Office of Thrift Supervision, impractical businesses, and subprime
mortgage lending. 32
Larger thrifts contributed to the mortgage crisis of 2008, so it is appropriate
for the government to regulate and supervise the thrift industry more strictly. 33
However, thrifts have been operating their businesses successfully since the crisis.
There are several reasons why regulatory agencies should supervise and regulate
larger commercial banks and thrifts differently. The commercial banking industry has
much greater assets, liabilities, and capital ten times more than thrifts. 34 The
commercial banking industry has more diverse business models than thrifts as well. 35
Based on these facts, the entire banking industry poses much bigger systemic risks
than thrifts. In short, similar level of regulation on banks and thrifts is not reasonable.
Several thrifts became insolvent since 2010, including La Jolla Bank, FSB,
Lydian Private Bank, and First Federal Bank. Each of the institutions demonstrates

31

Id.

32

See id. at 183–84 (stating that the formal director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Reich, was in
favor of deregulating the thrift industry and allowed thrifts industry to go with the pay-option ARM).
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Id. at 176 (stating that thrifts were significantly engaged in subprime mortgage lending and other
risky activities under the support of the director of the OTS and these activities resulted in catastrophe.
Also, it is no exaggeration to say that the mortgage crisis of 2009 was largely caused by thrifts because
“of the seven biggest depository institution failures in 2007 and 2008, five of them were thrifts
supervised by OTS”).
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10, 2013).

35

See id.
68

how the Dodd-Frank Act may adversely affect the thrift industry. First, La Jolla Bank,
FSB (La Jolla) had $3,751,254 in total assets and began to have problems after late
2008. 36 La Jolla’s net income had decreased since late 2008. 37 La Jolla was declared
an insolvent financial institution in early 2010. 38 According to La Jolla’s income
statement, it had a positive net income of $15,540 in September 2008. 39 However, in
late 2008, La Jolla recorded a negative net income of $9,710, and in September 2009,
it recorded a more serious negative net income of $13,166. 40 Finally, in late 2009, La
Jolla recorded its worst negative net income: $289,598. 41 According to La Jolla’s
balance sheet, mortgage loans were the main financial services of La Jolla and most
of its earnings came from mortgages. 42 In September 2008, La Jolla earned interest
income of $55,499 from mortgage loans. 43 But in September and December of 2009,

36
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2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/09302008/tfr/tfrsc.asp (last visited Nov. 10,
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it earned less interest income from mortgage loans, decreasing from $46,398 to
$38,239. 44 Because La Jolla lost its main source of income (mortgage loans) there
were no viable alternatives to earn interest based on its interest income statement.45
Eventually, La Jolla could no longer operate its business. 46
Under these circumstances, La Jolla probably found it impossible to comply
with the Dodd-Frank Act. Even if La Jolla survived, La Jolla probably would have
faced at least two problems. The first problem is that it would not have been able to
afford to spend compliance costs to hire Dodd-Frank Act experts and lawyers. Also,
increased capital requirements would have prevented La Jolla from expanding its
business because increased capital requirements limit what financial institutions can
do. By setting a high capital standard, the government prevents thrifts from
undertaking risky activities, which may result in an unfavorable business environment
where thrifts fail to increase profits. Eventually, this may lead thrifts to become
insolvent.
In addition to the compliance costs and increased capital standards, La Jolla
would have been limited in making loans to its consumers because the Dodd-Frank
Act requires high standardization. With high standardization, La Jolla would have
been allowed to make loans only to consumers with good credit. Of course, La Jolla
on its own would not have caused another subprime mortgage crisis, and small banks
43

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Sept. 30,
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/09302008/tfr/tfrso.asp.
44

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Sept. 30,
2009), supra note 36; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL
REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 2009), supra note 41.
45

See id.

46

Supra note 38.
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in local communities need to have a somewhat weaker standardization in order to
make loans. This is because small banks and thrifts usually deal with average people
or unbanked people. If there was no flexibility in standardization, La Jolla would have
faced much greater deficits by complying with the Dodd-Frank Act.
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, La Jolla would have the burden of not only
increased capital requirements, high standardization, and compliance costs, but also
the stricter QTL test. 47 Complying with the Dodd-Frank Act would have been too
much for La Jolla to continue operating its business. When La Jolla’s main income
source from the mortgage lending business decreased, it could not invest more in
other kinds of businesses due to the QTL test and the higher capital requirements. On
the other hand, if La Jolla were not obligated by law to invest a certain percentage in
residential mortgages, it would have found other ways to make a profit. In addition,
La Jolla was exposed to the instability created by the bad housing market. Therefore,
there was a high possibility that La Jolla, even if it survived, would have faced
difficulties in complying with the Dodd-Frank Act.
Another insolvent thrift was Lydian Private Bank (Lydian). Lydian had
$2,116,737 in assets, and its main business was mortgage loans as of the end of
2008. 48 Lydian had big problems since 2010 when it recorded a negative net income

47
Morrison & Foerster, Thrift Institutions after Dodd-Frank: The New Regulatory Framework 3 (Dec.
2011), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/111208-Thrift-Institutions-UserGuide.pdf (stating that “Dodd-Frank imposes new sanctions for the failure by a savings association to
comply with the qualified thrift lender test,” and “the principle change is that the one-year grace period
to return to compliance is eliminated”); The QTL test makes thrifts focus more on providing mortgage
loans and other household loans, it has been argued that “the QTL rule made thrifts highly exposed to
residential mortgages, placing them at heightened risk.” See supra note 30.
48
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SC (Dec. 31,
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312008/tfr/tfrsc.asp.
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of $47,154. 49 In December 2008, Lydian had $20,100 of interest income from the
mortgage loans, but in December of 2009, its interest income decreased to $14,386. 50
One year later, Lydian recorded a $10,305 interest income with a large negative net
income of $47,154. 51 With another negative income of $23,356 in March 2011,
Lydian eventually became insolvent in August 2011. 52
The Dodd-Frank Act may have negatively affected Lydian’s business for the
following reasons. First, according to Lydian’s balance sheet and income statement,
its interest income from mortgage loans decreased. Lydian also relied heavily on
mortgage lending, and (assuming that Lydian had problems with mortgage lending) it
probably had no other alternatives. Because the Dodd-Frank Act required increased
capital from Lydian, Lydian could not expand its business. Lydian would have also
struggled with its lending business because of the increased standardization provision
in the Dodd-Frank Act. Larger commercial banks have different tiers of financial
consumers, from average people to big businessmen, so they suffer less from
standardization. However, thrifts have their unique financial consumers, who are
primarily local people with average or low-incomes. Under the standardization, thrifts
may lose their target consumers because the consumers may no longer be eligible to

49

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31,
2010), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312010/tfr/tfrso.asp.
50
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31,
2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312008/tfr/tfrso.asp; FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (Dec. 31, 2009), available at
http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/12312009/tfr/tfrso.asp.
51

Supra note 49.

52

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FAILED BANKS ON INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lydian.html; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS,
SO (Mar.
31,
2011),
available
at
http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/03312011/tfr/tfrso.asp.
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borrow money from them. Moreover, because Lydian had to comply with the QTL
test, it could not invest in other alternatives to make profits. Thrifts also seem to be
very vulnerable to unfavorable circumstances whenever the economy or housing
market deteriorates. Furthermore, Lydian had the burden of spending compliance
costs to conform to the Dodd-Frank Act, by incurring hiring fees for experts or
lawyers.
With the above situations resulting from stricter regulations of the DoddFrank Act, Lydian could not avoid insolvency. The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is
to promote sound and safe financial systems and to protect financial consumers, but
ironically it may cause unsafe financial systems by imposing heavy regulations
without considering the different sizes and conditions of the regulated institutions.
The Act may even cause more insolvency of thrifts and threaten the stability of the
financial system. It must also be noted that financial consumers with average or low
incomes and unbanked individuals could suffer limited access to financial services if
thrifts can no longer operate under the Dodd-Frank Act. Commercial banks sometimes
are unwilling to provide financial services for this group because the bank can still
make profits without loaning to these individuals. Therefore, the thrift industry needs
suitable regulations based on its size and unique business character in order to thrive
in the U.S. financial world.
The last illustration is First Federal Bank (FFB). FFB had $140,802 in total
assets, and its main business was also mortgage lending as of June 30, 2009.53
According to FFB’s balance sheet and income statement, FFB had no profit

53
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SC (June 30,
2009), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/06302009/tfr/tfrsc.asp.
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alternatives without mortgage lending. 54 Without alternatives, it was probably very
difficult to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. In June 2009, FFB recorded deficits of
$176. 55 A year later, it recorded worse deficits of $1,861, and in June 2012, FFB
made a serious negative record of $3,623. 56 These deficits were probably the main
cause of FFB’s insolvency in April of 2013. 57
FFB was quite a small thrift with $108,889 in total assets, and it is unlikely
that FFB could afford compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act. 58 Under the Act, FFB
had to spend compliance costs to understand the Act by hiring legal experts. As FFB
had only twenty-eight employees, they probably had to retain advisors, but hiring
them was hard due to the cost. 59 In addition to the compliance cost, the Dodd-Frank
Act increased capital rules and standardization for lending, which might have
prevented FBB from making a profit. It has unique customers, so the standardization
prevented its customers from having access to financial services provided by FBB.
Also, it is likely that the increased capital rules and the QTL test thwarted FBB’s

54

See id; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO
(June 30, 2009), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/06302009/tfr/tfrso.asp.
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (June 30,
2009).
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, CALL AND THRIFT FINANCIAL REPORTS, SO (June 30,
2010), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/06302010/tfr/tfrso.asp; FEDERAL FINANCIAL
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041
(Jan.
28,
2013),
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/Public/ViewPDFFacsimile.aspx.
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Institution Failures, IBANKNET, http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/filist.aspx?type=failures
(last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
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2013).
74

business because FBB was limited to conducting mortgage lending. When the
condition of the economy or housing market is bad, FBB, a small-scale thrift, could
not survive under the Dodd-Frank Act.

D. Conclusion
The Dodd-Frank Act may exacerbate the business operating conditions for
thrifts for several reasons: thrifts do not receive differentiated regulations under the
Dodd-Frank Act and face the same regulations as large commercial banks. Even
though the sizes and business models are clearly different between commercial banks
and thrifts, thrifts may be treated as commercial banks by regulatory agencies
according to the Dodd-Frank Act. Thus, it may be very hard for the thrift industry to
comply with regulations in the Act, including the increased capital requirement,
increased standardization, onerous compliance costs, and the stricter QTL test. With
the Dodd-Frank Act, thrifts may find it hard to set the right direction of operating their
businesses because they have no alternatives other than to engage in mortgage lending.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE S&L CRISIS, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, AND THE KOREAN
SAVINGS BANK CRISIS
A.

Overview
The S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis of 2008 interestingly share similar

causes and solutions. 1 Factors like deregulation, fluctuant interest rates, risky lending,
moral hazard, and inappropriate regulations, all contributed to the crises. 2 The
solutions were also similar in that the government removed regulatory agencies
responsible for the supervision of thrifts, the FHLBB and the OTS, after the S&L
crisis and after the mortgage crisis of 2008 respectively as a way of strengthening the
regulatory systems. 3 Analyzing the thrift industry before and after the S&L crisis and
the mortgage crisis of 2008 would be valuable for the U.S. government to prevent
another thrift crisis.
The Korean savings bank crisis shares many aspects in common with the
S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis that the U.S. has experienced. 4 Korean savings
banks and U.S. savings associations are less specialized businesses compared to
commercial banks, and the savings institutions in both countries were engaged in
risky lending business—one of the biggest reasons for the crises. 5 Project Financing

1

Diane Scott Docking, DÉJÀ VU? A Comparison of the 1980s and 2008 Financial Crises, J. OF BUS.,
ECON. & FINANCE 17, 18 (2012).
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Choi, Young-joo, The Influence of Large Shareholder in Savings Bank Insolvency and Regulation, 53
PUSAN NAT’L UNIV. L. REV. 193, 196 (2012).

5

Id. at 200–202.
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(PF) conducted by savings banks was the main causes of the Korean crisis, and the
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) offered by large thrifts such as Country Wide,
WAMU, and Indy Mac was also one of the significant contributing factors to the
mortgage crisis of 2008. 6 Studying the common factors between the crises would be
very useful for preventing future crises not only in Korea and the U.S., but also for
other financial markets in the world.
B.

The U.S. S&L Crisis
The U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis happened in the late 1980s, and was one of

the biggest financial crises in the U.S. 7 The crisis resulted from multiple causes such
as weak regulation, moral hazard, and a tough economic atmosphere, all of which
ruined the thrift industry. 8 More than 560 thrifts failed, and more than 1,000 thrifts
were acquired by either voluntary or supervisory mergers. 9 In response to the crisis,
the U.S. government eventually spent more than $160 billion to settle the crisis.10
After the crisis, the U.S. government enacted two new statutes, the Financial
Institutions Reforms, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which

6

KIM, YOUNG-PHIL, WHY DID SAVINGS BANKS GO BANKRUPT? 130 (2012); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL &
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT
STEPS 176–182 (2011).
7

LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S & L DEBACLE 3 (1991).

8

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT,
ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATE 6–10 (1993).
9

1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 169 (1997).
10

Id.
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abolished then-existing regulatory systems in order to promote a secure banking
environment. 11
1.

The Thrift Industry Before the U.S. S&L Crisis

Before the occurrence of the S&L crisis, the thrift industry had enjoyed
multiple favorable regulations. 12 Because of thrift-friendly regulations, thrifts were
able to participate in high-risk business activities. 13 There were reasons why the U.S.
government gave such favorable treatment to the thrift industry. 14 In the late 1970s,
thrifts faced serious difficulties due to the disintermediation following the double
figures market interest rates. 15 To help the troubled thrifts, the government provided
lax regulations as a break to thrifts. 16
(a) The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980
The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980

11

Id. at 187–188.

12

See infra pp.78–88 for more information on the favorable legislations.

13

The U. S. government eliminated the limitation of loan to values ratios resulting in much riskier
situation because the higher the ratio is, the higher risk lenders have. Also, the limits of interest rate for
deposits were eliminated, and opportunities for new and expanded activities were made available by
the government. See, supra note 9, at 176.
14

Docking, supra note 1, 18.

15
The disintermediation happened in the late 1970s in the U.S. because the commercial banking
industry provided “money market mutual funds” to financial consumers. Since the funds yielded much
higher rates than savings institutions did, financial consumers preferred using the funds to the savings
institutions. See id.
16

Id. The U.S. government enacted two legislations, the Depository Institution Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, to allow
the thrift industry to overcome their difficulties. Through the legislations, the government eliminated
several obstacles for thrifts by eliminating the limits of interest rates for deposits on thrifts, by
increasing insurance coverage for deposits, and by providing circumstances that allowed to make
various types of loan.
78

(DIDMCA) was enacted “to facilitate the implementation of monetary policy, to
provide for the gradual elimination of all limitations on the rates of interest which are
payable on deposits and accounts, and to authorize interest-bearing transaction
accounts, and for other purposes.” 17 DIDMCA helped thrifts increase loans and
investments up to 20% of their assets, and further raise liquidity and earnings of thrift
institutions. 18 The Act also allowed thrifts to provide various services such as
“Negotiable order of Withdrawal checking accounts (NOW), 19 trust services, 20 and
credit cards, 21” that thrifts previously could not offer. 22
Thrifts benefitted greatly from Section 303 of DIDMCA, under which they
were permitted to offer NOW accounts to their customers. 23 Furthermore, Section
303 limited withdrawals by deposit or account owners for third party transfers,
thereby protecting thrifts from large and frequent withdrawals by deposit or account
17

Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat.
132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).

18

Robert J. Laughlin, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 305 (1991);
§ 401(2), 94 Stat. at 153:
“LOANS OR INVESTMENTS LIMITED TO 20 PER CENTUM OF ASSETS.—The following loans
or investments are permitted, but authority conferred in the following subparagraphs is limited to not in
excess of 20 per centum of the assets of the association for each subparagraph:
"(A) COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS.—Loans on security of first liens upon other improved
real estate.
"(B) CONSUMER LOANS AND CERTAIN SECURITIES.—An association may make secured or
unsecured loans for personal, family, or household purposes, and may invest in, sell, or hold
commercial paper and corporate debt securities, as defined and approved by the Board.”
19

Id. § 303, 94 Stat. at 146.

20

Id. § 403, 94 Stat. at 156.

21

Id. § 402, 94 Stat. at 155.

22

Robert, supra note 18, at 306.

23

§ 303, 94 Stat. at 146.
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owners. 24 Under this section, individual or organization account–holders could
withdraw their deposits for transfer purposes only if they were non-profit in nature. 25
Section 402 allowed thrifts to start issuing credit cards and participating in
credit card businesses. 26 This section also allowed thrifts to take part in credit card
operations. 27 Section 403 permitted thrifts to participate in trust activities as long as
thrifts complied with state and local law. 28 This Act allowed thrifts to engage in
various businesses so that thrifts could compete with other depository institutions.
Section 403(n)(1) provided that thrifts could engage in trust activities in
accordance with state or local law. 29 Under Section 403(n)(1), service corporations
were permitted to invest in state-chartered or federally-chartered corporations that
were located in the same state where the headquarters of the association was
located. 30 Section 403(n)(2) stated that thrifts, which were permitted to have trust
powers, should operate in compliance with state or local law. 31 If thrifts were not in
compliance, they were not able to participate in trust activities. 32 Section 403(n)(3)
required thrifts to keep separate books and records for trust assets and those for

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. § 402, 94 Stat. at 155.

27

Id.

28

Id. § 403, 94 Stat. at 156.

29

Id. § 403(n)(1).

30

Id.

31

Id. § 403(n)(2).

32

Id.
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general assets. 33 Regarding books and records, state banking authorities were subject
to examination. 34 Section 403(n)(4) prohibited associations from taking “trust
department deposits of current funds” that were “subject to check or the deposit of
checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other items for collection or exchange
purposes.” 35 If an association failed, Section 403(n)(5) required the association to
provide the owners of funds that are held in trust for investment “a lien on the bond or
other securities” that was set apart and on top of their rights to claim against the
association’s estate. 36
DIDMCA phased out regulation Q, which had limited the maximum interest
rates that thrifts could provide. 37 The drafters of Section 202(a)(1) of title II of the
Act were concerned that limiting interest rates prevented depositors from depositing
their money. 38 They also believed that such limitations kept thrifts from competing
with other financial institutions for funds, and reduced home mortgage markets by
cutting the distribution of funds, which was opposite to the purpose of thrifts. 39
Section 202(a)(2) acknowledged that depositors deserved to receive market interest
rates on their savings accounts in thrifts that were able to generate and pay the

33

Id. § 403(n)(3).

34

Id.

35

Id. § 403(n)(4).

36

Id. § 403(n)(5).

37

Thrifts faced obstacles from external factors, including the case of disintermediation, but the
government provided several ways that thrifts could overcome the difficulties with new legislation.
Docking, supra note 1.
38

§ 202(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 142.

39

Id.
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interest. 40
Under Section 202(b), Congress declared that the purpose of title II,
Depository Institutions Deregulation, is “to provide for the orderly phase-out and the
ultimate elimination of the limitations on the maximum rates of interest and dividends
which may be paid on deposits and accounts by depository institutions by extending
the authority to impose such limitations for 6-year, subject to specific standards
designed to ensure a phase-out of such limitations to market rates of interest.” 41 As
its title clearly states, this Act was a breakthrough for thrifts, and resolved the
disintermediation issue by repealing Regulation Q. 42 Through the Act, the U.S.
government tried to assist the struggling thrift industry. 43
Section 308(a)(1) of the Act increased the insurance limit coverage from
$40,000 to $100,000 on the Financial Deposit Insurance Act. 44 Section 308(a)(2) was
an exception to this increased insurance coverage, and excluded failed financial
institutions that had been closed before this section became effective. 45
In summary, DIDMCA attempted to make thrifts competitive with other
financial institutions by allowing them to enter new fields of business, by letting them
comply with lenient regulations, and by providing them higher insurance coverage.

40

Id. § 202(a)(2).

41

Id. § 202(b).

42

Docking, supra note 1.

43

Id.

44

§ 308(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 147.

45

Id. § 308(a)(2).
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Through DIDMCA the U.S. government tried to ensure the survival of thrifts after the
hardships they had faced.
(b) The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn-St Germain)
was enacted to “revitalize the housing industry by strengthening the financial stability
of home mortgage lending institutions and ensuring the availability of home mortgage
loans.” 46 Like DIDMCA, this Act also helped thrifts overcome the difficulties they
were facing. 47 The drafters intended to provide stable financial institutions for
mortgage loans and invigorative the housing market. 48 Through the Garn-St Germain,
Congress hoped the thrift industry would enter new, diverse fields of business. 49 The
Act also allowed thrifts to compete with money market mutual funds. 50 The FHLBB
was authorized to assist thrifts, which had financial problems following the Act. 51 A
program was established by the Act to financially assist troubled thrifts. 52 Last, the
Act let thrifts keep same the interest rates as commercial banks. 53
Regarding the new fields of business, Section 322 of the Garn-St Germain

46
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
47

Supra note 9, at 175.

48

Robert, supra note 18, at 314.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.
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authorized thrifts to make real estate loans for up to 40% of their assets. 54 Section
323 of the Act authorized thrifts to invest in time deposits or other accounts of any
bank, under the FDIC or the FSLIC. 55 Section 324 of the Act gave thrifts the power
to invest in government securities. 56 Section 325 of the Act authorized thrifts to
invest in commercial and other loans, such as corporate, business, and agricultural, up
to 5% of total assets before the first day of 1984 or 10% of total assets after the first
day of 1984. 57 Thrifts were able to make commercial loans up to 30% of all assets
pursuant to Section 329 of the Act. 58 Section 330 permitted thrifts to invest in
“tangible personal property, including, without limitation, vehicles, manufactured
homes, machinery, equipment, or furniture, for rental or sale, but such investment
may not exceed 10 per centum of the assets of the association.” 59 Thrifts were also
able to make loans for educational purposes. 60 Lastly, the section allowed thrifts to
invest in foreign assistance investments and small business investment companies. 61

54

Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, § 322, 96 Stat. 1499 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
55

Id. § 323, 96 Stat. at 1499, 1500.

56

Id. § 324, 96 Stat. at 1500.

57

Id. § 325.

58

Id. § 329, 96 Stat. at 1502.

59

Id. § 330.

60

Id.

61

Id. “FOREIGN ASSISTANCE INVESTMENTS.—Investments in housing project loans having the
benefit of any guaranty under section 221 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or loans having the
benefit of any guarantee under section 224of such Act, or any commitment or agreement with respect
to such loans made pursuant to either of such sections and in the share capital and capital reserve of the
Inter-American Savings and Loan Bank. This authority extends to the acquisition, holding and
disposition of loans having the benefit of any guaranty under section 221 or 222 of such Act as
hereafter amended or extended, or of any commitment or agreement for any such guaranty.
Investments under this subparagraph shall not exceed, in the case of any association,1 per centum of
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In order to make it possible for thrifts to compete with other financial
institutions, such as money market mutual funds, Section 327 of the Garn-St Germain
created a money market deposit account. 62 There was no limitation on the deposit
accounts with respect to maximum rates or interest rates, so that thrifts could compete
with the MMMF. 63 In addition, the account was not treated the same as transaction
accounts. 64 As a result, the money market deposit account enabled thrifts to be
competitive with other institutions.
Section 123 of the Garn-St. Germain stated that when a financial institution
met significant hardships that were capable of causing unstable and unsafe financial
markets, the troubled institution may be entitled to receive financial assistance from
other healthy financial institutions or companies. 65 It stated that troubled financial
institutions “are eligible for assistance pursuant to section 406(f) of this Act to merge
or consolidate with, or to transfer its assets and liabilities to, any other insured
institution or any insured bank, may authorize any other insured institution to acquire
control of said insured institution, or may authorize any company to acquire control of
said insured institution or to acquire the assets or assume the liabilities thereof.” 66

the assets of such association.” “SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES.—An association
may invest in stock, obligations, or other securities of any small business investment company formed
pursuant to section 301(d) of the Small Business Investment Act of1958, for the purpose of aiding
members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, but no association may make any investment under
this subparagraph if its aggregate outstanding investment under this subparagraph would exceed 1 per
centum of the assets of such association."
62

Id. § 327, 96 Stat. at 1501.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. § 123, 96 Stat. at 1483.

66

Id. § 123 (m)(1)(A)(i).
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Prior to receiving assistance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was required
to consult with state officials. 67 Even if the state officials had a good reason to oppose
the assistance, the Corporation could still decide to provide assistance to the failed
thrifts by a unanimous vote by the management of the Corporation. 68 Regarding the
assistance, a healthy thrift in the same state was considered first in determining what
institution the troubled thrifts should merge with. 69 The Corporation gave priority not
only to adjacent healthy financial institutions, but also to institutions of the same
corporate governance, such as minority control, as the insolvent thrifts had. 70 The
FHLBB was newly responsible for managing the acquisitions of troubled institutions
following the Act. 71
Section 122 of this Act was drafted to provide assistance to thrift institutions,
and financial support to troubled institutions.72 The Corporation was permitted to
financially support thrifts if the support was to prevent thrifts from being in default, to
help thrifts return to a healthy status, to maintain the stability of important thrifts, or
to reduce risk for the Corporation. 73 The Corporation also had the power to stipulate

67

Id. § 123 (B)(i).

68

Id. § 123 (B)(iii).

69

Id. § 123(m)(3)(B), 96 Stat. at 1484. “(i) First, between depository institutions of the same type
within the same State; (ii) Second, between depository institutions of the same type in different States;
(iii) Third, between depository institutions of different types in the same State; and (iv) Fourth,
between depository institutions of different types in different States.”
70

Id. § 123(m)(3)(C).

71

Robert, supra note 18.

72

§ 122, 96 Stat. at 1480.

73

Id. § 122 (f)(1).
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rules when thrifts were considered to be in default. 74 Whenever such thrifts seemed
to be in default or to be negatively influencing other thrifts, the Corporation was able
to stipulate the rules. 75 The Corporation was permitted to provide support for
troubled thrifts to the extent necessary “to save the cost of liquidating,” but this
limitation did not apply to cases where the Corporation believed that the thrifts were
necessary for the purpose of providing community financial services. 76 The
Corporation did not have the authority to manage certain stocks, such as “voting or
common stock.” 77
When federal thrifts were in default, the Corporation could act as the
conservator or receiver in order to maintain a stable and secure financial market. 78
For state thrifts, however, the FHLBB was authorized to appoint the Corporation as a
conservator or receiver for state thrifts in default. 79
Section 326 of the Act removed different interest rates between commercial
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banks and thrifts that were insured by the FDIC and the FSLIC respectively. 80 With
this section, thrifts became more competitive with commercial banks.
The Garn-St. Germain Act, therefore, seemed to be beneficial legislation for the thrift
industry. The Act allowed thrifts to enter more diverse businesses than before, and to
be offered financial support when they faced serious difficulties. It also eliminated the
limits on interest rates so that thrifts could compete with other financial institutions,
including commercial banks.
With these two acts, DIDMCA and the Garn-St. Germain Act, thrifts were
able to enter non-traditional markets that they had not done before. The acts also
enabled thrifts to have more authority over their business. Altogether, these two acts
were enacted to help the thrift industry by removing certain obstacles.
2.

After the U.S. S&L Crisis

After the S&L crisis, the U.S. government enacted two statutes to address the
problems created by the crisis and to prevent another crisis in the future: the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and the
Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991(FDICIA). 81
(a) The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989
These two Acts were enacted to resolve the crisis with the ultimate goal of
minimizing future taxpayer losses following the S&L crisis. During the administration
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of President George Herbert Walker Bush, FIRREA was passed to solve the problem
of failed savings associations. 82 Section 401(a)(1)(2) of FIRREA removed the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). 83 And Section 401(e)(3) mandated all functions of
the FHLBB and the FSLIC to be transferred to the Office of Thrift Supervision, the
Resolution Trust Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Federal Housing Finance Board, and authorized these new agencies to continue acting
as the preceding agencies did. 84 Section 206(a)(7) enabled the FDIC to manage the
insurance funds, such as the Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings Association
Insurance Fund. 85 Section 501 created an Oversight Board to assist failed thrifts as a
conservatorship or receivership. 86
The FIRREA heightened capital requirements on thrifts to prevent thrifts
from engaging in high-risk activities. 87 The Act not only empowered regulators with
enhanced authority to supervise thrifts, but also increased the criminal and civil
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penalties thrifts faced for crimes they commit. 88 However, although the Act increased
regulations on thrifts to prevent another potential crisis, it was insufficient to solve all
the problems that arose from the S&L crisis. 89 In particular, the Act did not deal with
intrinsic problems or insurance issues. 90 In order to reinforce FIRREA, the U.S.
government passed another statute, the FDICIA, which had a significant impact on the
regulatory system of banks. 91
(b) The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991
The two purposes of the FDICIA were first, to recapitalize the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF), and second, to amend the banking regulatory system, including
deposit insurance in order to protect taxpayers. 92 Section 104 of FDICIA allowed the
FDIC to recapitalize the bank insurance fund. 93 This section allowed the Board of
Directors to make assessment rates when the remaining funds held by the FDIC were
equivalent or insufficient to the standard rates. 94 With this section, the FDIC was able
to sufficiently maintain the bank insurance fund. 95
Section 302 authorized the Board of Directors to create “a risk-based
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assessment system” for financial institutions that were members of the FDIC. 96 The
assessment system was calculated half-yearly based on various situations. 97 In order
to reserve sufficient insurance funds, the Board of Directors conducted “semiannual
assessments for insured depository institutions.” 98 When the FDIC calculated
whether the insurance funds would be sufficient, it mostly relied on four factors:
“expected operating expenses; case resolution expenditures and income; the effect of
assessments on members’ earnings and capital, and; any other factors that the Board
of Directors may deem appropriate.” 99 The half-yearly assessment was required to be
either equal to or more than $1,000 for each insured institution. 100 Under Section 302,
deposit insurance funds had to keep the yearly standard rate at “1.25 percent of
estimated insured deposits; or a higher percentage of estimated insured deposits that
the Board of Directors determines to be justified for that year by circumstances
raising a significant risk of substantial future losses to the fund.” 101 Some insured
financial institutions were required to keep higher insurance premiums and more
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capital according to the risk-based assessments. 102
To achieve the purposes of FDICIA, two provisions of the Act were very
important: first was the prompt corrective action and the second was the least cost
resolution. 103 First, Section 131 stated that the purpose of the prompt corrective
action was to resolve the problem of insured financial institutions having a bad effect
on “the deposit insurance funds.” 104 The prompt corrective action approach tried to
promote a safe and sound financial atmosphere by requiring financial regulators to
become much stricter on financial institutions that had bad capital. 105 Pursuant to the
Act, financial regulators were required to evaluate whether a financial institution is
sound and safe. 106 For instance, there were five capital classes, “well capitalized,
adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, or critically
undercapitalized,” 107 and among these classes, financial institutions were evaluated
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by financial regulators based on the financial institutions’ status. 108 In this section,
capital standards contained “a leverage limit, and a risk-based capital requirement,”
but these standards could be revoked if the federal financial supervisors considered
the standards to be an inappropriate way to implement this section. 109
If a financial institution was evaluated as undercapitalized, financial
regulators were required to strictly supervise it, and if a financial institution was
considered significantly undercapitalized, financial regulators were required to order
it to be placed in a conservatorship or receivership. 110 Several provisions could apply
to undercapitalized financial institutions. 111 The first provision limited the ability of
undercapitalized institutions to distribute their capital, although certain exceptions
applied. 112 First, financial institutions were permitted by federal financial agencies to
“repurchase, redeem, retire, or otherwise acquire shares or ownership interests,” if
their “repurchase, redemption, retirement, or other acquisition” involved issuing
additional shares or liabilities of the institution in the same or greater amount, and if
such transactions decreased the institution’s liabilities or enhanced the institution’s
financial soundness. 113
Secondly, undercapitalized institutions were not allowed to pay management
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fees to those who controlled the institutions.114 In addition, federal financial agencies
were required to monitor the current status of the institutions, and determine whether
the institutions were complying with the restrictions and regulations. 115 Also, the
institutions were required to hand in “an acceptable capital restoration plan” to federal
financial agencies. 116 The undercapitalized institutions were limited in their ability to
grow their assets unless three exceptions were met. 117 The three exceptions were: the
“institution’s capital restoration plan” was accepted by federal financial agencies;
growth of whole assets complied with the capital restoration plan; or during the
calendar quarter, the tangible equity to assets ratio rose fast enough to allow adequate
capitalization within an acceptable period of time. 118 Last, the undercapitalized
institutions were able to receive interest from other insured financial institutions that
accepted deposits, or to expand an extra branch office and fresh line of business as
long as three requirements were satisfied: the capital restoration plan was accepted by
federal financial agencies; the institution followed the plan; and, the agencies verified
that the proposed actions were compatible with the goals of both the plan and this
section. 119
Federal financial agencies could implement several actions to deal with
significantly undercapitalized financial institutions that failed to comply with
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regulations such as submitting the capital restoration plan and carrying out an
approved plan. 120 The first action was to require recapitalization under which the
federal banking agencies had the power to demand that institutions keep adequate
capitalization by selling shares, voting shares, and obligations. 121 If an institution was
almost placed in a conservator or receiver, they had to be taken over by a financial
holding company or merged with another financial institution. 122
The second action was to restrict the transactions with affiliates by the
institutions.123 The next one was to limit institutions from providing higher interests
on deposits than their competitors in the local area, but no retroactive application was
allowed. 124 Institutions also had limits on increasing their assets, or were demanded
to decrease their assets. 125 The federal banking agencies demanded the institutions,
including their subsidiaries, not to undertake activities that may pose a high risk. 126
The institutions were also required to develop their management, such as electing a
new director, discharging directors, and hiring proven “senior executive officers.”127
In addition, the institutions were not allowed to receive deposits from “correspondent
banks,” and a bank holding company of any institution was allowed to distribute
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capital only if the BHC received approval from the FRB in advance. 128 Lastly, the
institutions or their parent companies, including depository institutions, subsidiaries,
but not non-depository ones, were required to divest themselves if they were
considered to have a negative effect on financial stability. 129
For critically undercapitalized financial institutions, several restrictions and
requirements were put in place under which such institutions were not allowed to pay
for any subordinated debt within sixty days after becoming critically undercapitalized,
and the institutions were required to be placed in a conservatorship and a receivership
within ninety days after falling into the critically undercapitalized category. 130 Also,
critically undercapitalized financial institutions were prohibited from carrying out
activities such as doing unusual business, increasing the credit on any leveraged
business, revising any charter and bylaws of the institutions, changing their
“accounting method,” doing business under Section “23A(b) of the Federal Reserve
Act,” providing substantial remunerations or extra rewards, or providing interest on
debts that were much higher than normal rates on the market. 131 However, if a
financial institution had prior approval from the Corporation, they were allowed to do
such activities. 132
Last, under the “transition rule,” the OTS’s role of caring for insured savings
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associations could not be reduced by the role of the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC). 133 In addition, the Act provided a grace period for some savings associations
that had, before the FDICIA was enacted, handed in a plan complying with “section
5(t)(6)(A)(ii) of the Home Owner’s Loan Act.” 134 As long as such plan was accepted
by the Director of the OTS and remained in effect, and if the savings associations
complied with the plan or were operating pursuant to a written agreement with the
relevant federal banking agency, they were exempted from complying with
“subsections (e)(2), (f), and (h)” of the Act. 135
In accordance with FDICIA, financial regulators were therefore able to
strictly supervise and regulate a financial institution that could have financial
problems, and thereby play a role in preventing another financial crisis. 136 In addition
to the prompt corrective action, “the least cost resolution” was also one of the
significant provisions of FDICIA. The purpose of the provision was to spend the least
amount of money on solving the financial crisis by demanding the FDIC to find out
the best way to cut down the cost for taxpayers. 137 However, this provision did not
apply to “too big to fail” cases. 138
Section 141 enabled the FDIC to assist its insured financial institutions only
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when the FDIC needed to serve “insurance coverage” as part of its duty to
problematic institutions. 139 The FDIC was responsible for providing least-cost
insurance coverage to its members by using two methods. 140 Section 141 required the
FDIC to do “present-value analysis and documentation” in which the FDIC took
advantage of practical reduced price to assess current worth as a substitute, and collect
documentation which included the assessment and the presumption about “interest
rates, asset recovery rates, asset holding costs, and payment of contingent
liabilities.” 141 This section also required the U.S. government to give up tax
revenues. 142
When insured depository institutions were under a conservatorship or
receivership, “the determination of the costs of liquidation” had to be made on the
first occurrence of the appointment of conservator, appointment of receivership, or
determination by the FDIC to provide assistance. 143 When the FDIC decided to assist
an institution, the expense had to be set as soon as possible. 144 The cost of liquidating
institutions could not be greater than “the amount which is equal to the sum of the
insured deposits of such institution as of the earliest of” the above events, minus “the
present value of the total net amount the FDIC reasonably expects to receive from the
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disposition of the assets of such institution in connection with such liquidation.” 145 In
addition to the cost of liquidation, the deposit insurance funds could not be used to
protect depositors and creditors even if a troubled institution could have an
enormously negative effect on the funds. 146
Under 141 (E)(iii), persons or entities who purchased and assumed “liabilities
of insured depository institutions for which the Corporation has been appointed
conservator or receiver,” could still acquire such institutions’ uninsured deposit
liabilities, “if the insurance fund does not incur any loss concerning such deposit
liabilities in an amount greater than the loss which would have been incurred with
respect to such liabilities, if the institution had been liquidated.” 147 Lastly, this
Section permitted the FDIC, prior to the conservatorship or receivership, to assist
troubled insured depository institutions only when the institutions were fully expected
to be under the conservatorship or receivership. 148 Institutions that complied with
other regulations, but seemed likely to be under a conservatorship or receivership in
the future and not recover unless assisted by the FDIC, could be supported by the
FDIC prior to the conservatorship or receivership. 149
Congress believed that it was imperative for the federal banking agencies to
provide an “early resolution of troubled insured depository institutions” so long as the
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cost-impact of the early resolution on the deposit insurance fund would be low and the
early resolution was consistent with FDIA’s corrective action provisions. 150 The
agencies were encouraged to follow a number of standards when making the early
decision. 151 One of the standards was that the decision-action should be a
“competitive negotiation” to quickly deal with problems that may have significantly
negative effects on the depository insurance funds. 152 Institutions, including the
“resulting institution,” needed to comply with relevant capital principals when they
took over problematic banks. 153
In addition, “substantial private investment” had to be involved in the action,
and “the preexisting owners and debtholders” of problematic institutions, including
holding companies, were required to give massive concessions. 154 Under Section 143,
the directors and management of the resulting institutions were required to meet
qualifications, and individuals who were deeply involved in the problems of the
troubled institutions were prohibited from serving as directors or managers of the
resulting institutions.155 The resolution enabled the FDIC to engage in “the success of
the resulting institution.” 156 Lastly, FDIC’s responsibility for the actions was limited,
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and new venture capitalists were required to take on some risk with the FDIC. 157
Section 241 of the Act stated that the purpose of the “FDIC affordable
housing program” was to assist families that earned low salaries, and to help them
afford houses or rental homes. 158 The FDIC created the affordable housing program
office whose purpose was to assist a particular group of people: those who were
facing home foreclosures. 159
Section 304 of the Act restricted the land lending that federal financial
agencies should accept consistent with regulations regarding principles of “extension
of credits” that should be “secured by liens on interests in real estate; or made for the
purpose of financing the construction of a building or other improvements to real
estate,” within nine months after FDICIA was effective. 160 The principles that the
agencies were required to consider were: risk of the extension of credits posed to the
insurance funds for deposit, safety and soundness of the financial institutions, and
“the availability of credit.” 161 Also, there were several categories of loans that the
federal agency needed to distinguish based on compliance with federal regulations
including warranty of the risk to the fund, and warranty of the soundness and safety of
insured depository institutions. 162
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Section 263 required depository institutions to unambiguously disclose
detailed interest rates, including precise yield, on either demand accounts or interestbearing accounts when the institutions were advertised. 163 By doing so, depositors
could be protected by the disclosed information about those kinds of accounts.
However, an exception applied to depository institutions when they advertised the
information through mass media, where they were not required to state specific
information about the minimum deposit required for a new account and deductible
yield. 164 Finally, depository institutions were enjoined from stating misleading
statements of “deposit contracts,” and “Free or No-Cost accounts” through any
advertisement. 165
Section 301 of the Act limited “brokered deposits” and “deposit
solicitations”. 166 Under §1831f (a), insured depository institutions that were not well
capitalized were prohibited from receiving funds obtained “by or through” deposit
brokers, either “directly or indirectly.” 167 There were two exceptions to this
prohibition: permission by the Corporation and exceptions for conservatorships.168
Under §1831f (e), “insured depository institutions” that were allowed to receive funds
under these two exceptions were prohibited from paying “a rate of interest for such
funds” exceeding, “at the time of acceptance of such funds,” either “the rate paid on

163

Id. § 263(a), Stat. at 2334, 2335.

164

Id. § 263(b), Stat. at 2335.

165

Id. § 263(c)-(d).

166

Id. § 301, Stat. at 2343.

167

Id. § 301(e), Stat. at 2344.

168

Id.
102

deposits of similar maturity in such institution’s normal market area for deposits
accepted in the institution’s normal market area” or “the national rate paid on deposits
of comparable maturity, as established by the Corporation, for deposits accepted
outside the institution’s normal market area.” 169 This act limited deposit solicitation
that undercapitalized “insured depository institutions,” in their efforts to solicit
deposits, and were not allowed to offer rates “significantly higher than the prevailing
rates interest” in their “normal market areas,” or in other market areas where deposits
would be deposited. 170
In conclusion, the primary purpose of FIRREA and FDICIA was to solve the
crisis and to prevent another crisis, including protecting taxpayers by reforming
operations, regulatory systems, and rules, and by recapitalizing the bank insurance
fund. Through FIRREA, the government tried to save the problematic savings
institutions by reforming regulatory agencies 171 and by authorizing the FDIC to assist
the troubled institutions.172 Pursuant to the Act, the FDIC was responsible for the BIF
by recapitalizing and assessing the fund. 173 In addition to FIRREA, the prompt
corrective actions and the least cost resolution of FDICIA were significant provisions
to achieve the purpose of the Act. 174 With the prompt corrective action, regulatory
agencies could supervise regulated thrifts based on their capital categories, which
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ranged from well capitalized to critically undercapitalized. 175 Thus, according to the
categories of the thrifts, regulators could take immediate regulatory actions on the
thrifts, or place the thrift in a conservatorship or receivership. With the least cost
resolution, the government tried to spend the least cost to solve the financial crisis.176
In the event of a thrift failure, the FDIC must consider on a case-by-case basis
whether the FDIC should assist the failed thrift and spend the cost.
C.

Prior to the Mortgage Crisis
The U.S. mortgage crisis of 2008, considered the biggest crisis since the

Great Depression, had a tremendous impact on the financial industry and on the
global economy. Many factors contributed to the mortgage crisis; one of the biggest
causes was lenient regulation on the financial industry. Prior to the crisis, Section 509
of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA”) allowed low-income people to
get loans. 177 Pursuant to this section, financial institutions were able to make loans to
a group of people that had little or no ability to pay back their loans. 178 Financial
institutions justified the loans by claiming they benefited local communities. 179
However, financial institutions could not make loans unless making a loan would be
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safe and sound. 180
Prior to the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994 (“IBBEA”), banking institutions were only able to do business, including
acquisitions, within their home states. 181 However, IBBEA enabled the banking
industry to do business out of their home states, allowing banks to expand and open
and operate branches in other states. 182 Section 101 of the Act permitted the Board to
approve bank holding companies that were of good capitalization and management
“to acquire control of, or acquire all or substantially all of the assets of, a bank located
in a State other than the home State of such bank holding company, without regard to
whether such transaction is prohibited under the law of any State.” 183
The Act, however, prohibited bank holding companies from doing any
interstate business such as acquisitions, if they did not meet the minimum years of
existence requirement under the “statutory law of the host State.” 184 An exception
allowed bank holding companies to do business in a host state regardless of the
“statutory law of the host State,” if they had been in existence for more than five
years. 185 The IBBEA preserved State contingency laws when four of the following
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terms were met: 186 if the state law did not discriminate against “out-of State Banks,
out-of-State bank holding companies, or subsidiaries of such banks or bank holding
companies”; if the state law was enacted earlier than the IBBEA; if the FDIC made no
determination that abiding the State law would cause “an unacceptable risk to the
appropriate deposit insurance fund”; and if the Federal banking agency in charge for
such bank did not find that abiding by State law would cause adverse conditions. 187
The Act placed a cap on the concentration of bank holding companies by
imposing both nationwide concentration limits and “statewide concentration limits
other than with respect to initial entries.” 188 The Act established nationwide
concentration limits by prohibiting banking holding companies controlling, or
companies that would control after the acquisition, ten percent of the “total amount of
deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States” from conducting
acquisitions. 189 The Act also imposed “statewide concentration limits other than with
respect to initial entries” by preventing bank holding companies controlling “any
insured depository institution in the home State of any bank to be acquired or in any
host State in which any such bank maintains a branch” and will “control thirty percent
or more of the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in any such
State” from conducting acquisitions. 190 However, there was an exception to the
limitation on statewide concentration which permitted applicants to carry out
186
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acquisitions if state law permitted control of “a greater percentage of total deposits of
all insured depository institutions in the State than the percentage permitted” under
the statewide concentration clause of the IBBEA, and if the state bank supervisor gave
permission for the acquisition, and such permission was given based on a nondiscriminatory standard. 191
Prior to the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), giant
companies were not allowed to further increase their size by using financial holding
companies. 192 However, after GLBA was enacted, large companies began to have
opportunities to do business through holding companies. 193 The Act enabled financial
holding companies to participate in new activities that they had not previously
participated in, such as “underwriting and selling insurance and securities, conducting
both commercial and merchant banking investing in and developing real estate and
other complimentary activities.” 194 Section 103 of GLBA enabled financial holding
companies to participate in the activities that were “financial in nature or incidental to
such financial activity,” that did not cause significant risks to “depository institutions
or the financial system generally.” 195
The determination whether the activities were “financial in nature or
incidental to such financial activity” was made by the Board consulting the Secretary
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of the Treasury. 196 When determining whether the activities were “in financial nature
or incidental to a financial activity,” the Board was required to consider three
factors. 197 First, the Board was obligated to consider the purpose of the Bank Holding
Company Act and the GLBA. 198 Second, the Board had to take into account the
changes in the marketplace and the “technology for delivering financial services.” 199
Third, the Board was required to consider whether the activity under review is
“necessary or appropriate to allow a financial holding company and their affiliates” to
facilitate effective competition, provide efficient delivery of information and services
and to offer customers “any available or emerging technological means for using
financial services or for the document imaging data.” 200 Under this Act, financial
holding companies could participate in new activities, which set the stage for the
emergence of big banks and the “too big to fail” mentality. 201 In addition to the acts
mentioned above, the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 also contributed
to the crisis by increasing insurance coverage for a certain retirement account from
$100,000 to $250,000. 202
In conclusion, these five acts contributed to the financial crisis by enabling
thrifts to expand their business, including allowing them to make loans to low-income
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people, to do business in other states, and to participate in new activities through bank
holding companies with lenient regulations.
D.

After the Mortgage Crisis of 2008
After the mortgage crisis took place, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and

Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) and the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”) were enacted not only to solve the crisis but also
to prevent future crises. In particular, the EESA was enacted to solve the problems of
troubled assets, to create a safe and sound financial market, and to revitalize the
economy. 203
Congress declared that the purpose of the EESA was to “provide authority for
the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the
purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy and
financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend certain
expiring provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other
purposes.” 204 Section 101 of the Act gave power to the Secretary to build a “Troubled
Asset Relief Program” (“TARP”) to “purchase and to make and fund commitments to
purchase troubled assets” held by financial institutions. 205

203
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Section 102(a)(1) allowed the Secretary to create a guarantee program for the
troubled assets. 206 The Secretary was required to purchase only those troubled assets
that were “originated or issued before March 14 2008, including mortgage-backed
securities.” 207 Under Section 115(a)(3) the Secretary could not purchase toxic assets
greater than $700 billion if the President’s report on details of how the Secretary
would excise the authority was submitted to Congress, and no joint resolution was
enacted within fifteen calendar days from the submission of such report. 208
Section 106 (d) required the Secretary to deposit the proceeds from the sale of
troubled assets to the Treasury. 209 Further, banks could receive better lending
conditions by receiving capital from the Treasury pursuant to the Act. 210 These
provisions helped the financial institutions recover.
Section 136 of the Act established a temporary increase of the insurance
coverage under Section 11(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Depository Insurance Act (FDIA)
from $100,000 to $250,000. 211 Although it was meant to be a temporary measure, the
Dodd-Frank Act later established it as a permanent. 212 This increased insurance
coverage is expected to have positive effects on the financial market by ensuring a
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greater level of protection for depositors, but at the same time, there are concerns that
such measures might cause moral hazards.
Several organizations were created to supervise and analyze the TARP.
Section 104 created the “Financial Stability Oversight Board” (“FSOB”) responsible
for reviewing TARP, including TARP’s effects on “preserving home ownership,
stabilizing financial markets, and protecting taxpayers.” 213 This section also required
the TARP to make recommendations and reports on any illegal conduct. 214 Section
121 of the Act created “the Office of the Special Inspector General for TARP” to audit
and examine the actions of purchasing, managing, and selling troubled assets that the
Secretary purchases and guarantees. 215 Section 125 also created “the Congressional
Oversight Panel” to analyze the financial market and its regulations, and submit a
report of the findings to legislators. 216
The Office of Management and Budget was required to report an estimate of
how much it would cost to purchase and guarantee troubled assets, and to show how
the calculation was done. 217 It was also required to report how such estimates
affected loss and liabilities. 218
Financial institutions that sold their troubled assets to the Secretary were
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required to meet certain standards of executive compensation and corporate
governance. Section 111(b) stated that financial institutions were limited to the
compensation rules set by the Secretary. 219 Section 111(c) prohibited financial
institutions from providing a “golden Parachute” to any executive officer if the
institutions were under the auction purchases where the financial institutions sold
more than $300 million of their assets. 220
In conclusion, the EESA was drafted in an effort to manage troubled assets by
providing financial support to struggling financial institutions, and by tightening
financial regulations. Its drafters also attempted to stabilize the financial market, and
to revitalize the U.S. economy. This Act was one of the solutions to deal with the
mortgage crisis of 2008, and to prevent a future crisis.
The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted not only to alleviate the aftermath of the
mortgage crisis of 2008, but also to prevent another crisis in the future. The purpose
of the Act was to build up a stable, safe, and sound financial environment by
protecting financial consumers and taxpayers. 221 Like the related preceding Acts, the
Dodd-Frank Act was drafted in order to attack the misconception of “too big to
fail.” 222 How to combat the “too big to fail” mentality has been one of the hardest
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questions that the U.S. legislature and the executive have been faced with; whether
the Dodd-Frank Act will contribute to resolving the “too big to fail” problem remains
uncertain. 223
Section 111 of the Act established the “Financial Stability Oversight Council”
(“FSOC”), which consists of the heads of all regulatory agencies and governmental
corporations, and the Secretary of the Treasury was assigned as the chairperson of this
council. 224 It is the responsibility of the council to analyze risks in financial markets,
to intensify market regulations, and to take action against any potential hazards that
pose a risk to the financial market. 225 In order to maintain stable financial market
conditions, Section 112(a)(2) required the council to monitor financial markets and
regulations, to discover any threats to the market, and to make recommendations to
regulatory agencies on whether more intensive regulations could be put on financial
institutions. 226
Section 152 created the “Office of Financial Research” (“OFR”) whose head
is appointed by the President with the Senate’s consent. 227 Section 153 declared that
the OFR was established to assist the FSOC by gathering data and by undertaking
research with respect to systemic risks, financial market conditions, and any threats to
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the market. 228
Responding to the mortgage crisis, the U.S. government abolished the Office
of Thrift Supervision by transferring its role and authority to other regulatory
agencies. 229 Because the regulations and supervisions on the thrift industry by the
OTS had shown poor performance, the OTS was abolished. 230 Section 312
transferred all powers and functions of the OTS to the Board of Governors, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 231
In addition to the restructuring of the regulatory system of the thrift industry, Section
335 permanently increased the insurance coverage for deposits up to $250,000. 232 As
discussed earlier, the EESA temporarily increased the coverage up to $250,000, and
this section permanently increased it.
Under 165(a)(1), Congress required the Board of Governors to establish
“prudential standards” for both the nonbank financial companies under the
supervision of the Board of Governors, and the bank holding companies that had at
least fifty billion dollars in total consolidated assets. 233 The drafters demanded that
such regulations should be “more stringent than the standards and requirements
applicable to nonbank financial companies and bank holding companies” that did not
228
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carry with them similar risks. 234 Section 165(a)(2)(A) permitted the Board of
Governors to provide tailored applications to companies under review by considering
their specific characteristics, including “capital structure, riskiness, complexity,
financial activities, size and any other risk-related factors that the Board of Governors
deems appropriate.” 235 Section 165(a)(2)(B) allowed the Board of Governors to set
“an asset threshold” of more than $50 billion in order for the standards created under
Section 165(c) through (g) to apply. 236
Section 165(b)(1)(A) required the Board of Governors to set “prudential
standards” for nonbank financial companies and large bank holding companies with
total consolidated assets of fifty billion dollars or more. 237 This Section made the
Board of Governors responsible for establishing “prudential standards” that included
“risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits, liquidity requirements, overall
risk management requirements, resolution plan and credit exposure report
requirements as well as concentration limits.” 238 The nonbank financial companies
and bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of fifty billion dollars or
more also became subject to additional standards, such as “a contingent capital
requirement; enhanced public disclosures; short-term debt limits; such other
prudential standards as the Board of Governors, on its own or pursuant to a
recommendation made by the Council in accordance with section 115, determines are
234
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appropriate.” 239
Section 165(b)(3) required the Board of Governors to consider differences
among the bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies based on
several factors, including risk-related elements, the companies’ balance sheets, offbalance sheets, and whether or not they had financial institutions that accepted
deposits. 240 Section 166 required the Board of Governors to set early remediation to
assist troubled financial institutions defined in subsection (a) of Section 165. 241
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act is known as the Volker rule, which sets
limitations on “proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and
private equity funds.” 242 This Section prevented bank entities from participating in
proprietary trading. 243 Bank entities were not allowed to support or possess
connections with “a hedge fund or a private equity fund.” 244 Although there were
exceptions to the limitations of Section 619, the exceptions do not apply if the
activities would pose a significant risk to the financial market. 245
Section 712 conferred authorities to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate a swap market,
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and both agencies had to cooperate in dealing with the market. 246 In order to achieve
transparency and accountability of the swap market, Section 727 required the SEC to
provide the swap transaction data to the public. 247 Section 764 required “swap dealers
and major security-based swap participants” to register that they are the dealers or the
participants. 248 More recent regulations were introduced to achieve transparency and
accountability in the swap market. 249 Although the swap market did not contribute to
the mortgage crisis, Congress created these provisions as a preventive measure. 250
Section 932 created the “Office of Credit Ratings” (“OCR”) under the SEC to
regulate the “National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” (“NRSRO”) in
order to supervise whether the NRSRO was appropriately deciding credit ratings, and
protecting customers and the public interest related to the credit ratings. 251 The OCR
also regulated the NRSRO to promote the accuracy of the credit rating issued by the
NRSRO, and to guarantee that any conflicts of interest would not affect NRSRO’s
decisions regarding the issuance of the credit rating. 252
Section 941 introduced the “securitizer.” 253 Pursuant to this provision, the
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OCC, the FRB, and the FDIC with joint cooperation with the SEC were required to
regulate the securitizer by requiring them to keep an “economic interest in a portion of
the credit risk” when they made transactions with third parties. 254 In addition, the
securitizer was required to keep not more than five-percent of “the credit risk for any
asset.” 255
Section 951 enabled shareholders to approve executive compensation. 256
Section 1011 established the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection” (“BCFP”) to
protect financial consumers by mandating that financial institutions provide financial
services and products in compliance with “the Federal consumer financial laws.”257
The BCFP was created as a sub-organization under the FRB, but it was an
independent agency with its own director and deputy director. 258 The establishment
of the bureau is expected to improve the quality and the fairness of financial
institutions, resulting in better services that financial consumers can enjoy.
Section 1411 allowed creditors to make “a residential mortgage loan” to
borrowers only with appropriate evidence that borrowers had the ability to pay loans
back to creditors. 259 The evidence must be based on the borrower’s financial history
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and current information, such as the borrower’s current and future income, as well as
how much debt the borrower would have in the coming years. 260 This provision was
established to make sure borrowers of residential mortgage loans have the ability to
repay the loan, and if they do not, creditors could not make such loans. Because bad
loans were one of the significant causes of the mortgage crisis, this provision seems to
be another preventive measure against any future crisis.
In conclusion, the U.S. government tried to create a stable and safe financial
environment by adding multiple regulations and limitations, and creating several
agencies to create regulations, research, and monitor the condition of the financial
market and, financial activities, and provide protections for financial consumers.
E.

The Korean Savings Bank Crisis
The Korean savings bank crisis began in 2010, and caused the failure of one

fifth of the total savings banks in the nation, including the largest savings bank and
other major savings banks. 261 Since the crisis, it has been argued that savings banks
are no longer needed at all because savings banks have already lost their purpose. The
causes of the crisis were deregulation, inappropriate after-measures, such as
acquisitions, and moral hazard of large and controlling shareholders. 262 Because of
the crisis, the Korean government spent more than $26 billion, and the number of
260

Id. § 1411(a), 124 Stat. at 2143.

261

Kim, Tae-jong, 4 Savings Banks Suspended, THE KOREA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at
http://www,koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2012/05/123_110426.html; Choi, Myeong-yong, KDIC,
26 Savings Banks Declared As Poor Financial Institutions for Three-Year, NEWS1, May 23, 2013,
http://news1.kr/articles/1145314.

262
Chamyeoyondae (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), Five Major Failures of Savings
Banks Policy & 26 Responsible Officials, ISSUE REPORT, 1, 4 Mar. 29, 2012,
http://www.peoplepower21.org/885934.

119

victims stands at more than 100,000. 263
F.

Before & After the Korean Savings Bank Crisis
In March 2002, the official title of “savings and financial companies” was

changed to “mutual savings banks.” 264 The same institutions, but with a new title
were able to participate in a greater variety of activities than before. 265 Although the
savings banks had more limitations compared to the commercial banks, savings banks
were permitted to have branches. 266 The Korean government also deregulated savings
banks, and encouraged larger and healthier savings banks to acquire insolvent savings
banks by giving them several incentives. 267 In addition, insurance coverage for
savings bank deposits was increased. 268 With these favorable conditions, large
shareholders of savings banks could engage in high-risk and high-return investments.
The combination of these multiple factors caused the savings bank crisis. Since the
crisis, inspection by the governments of large shareholders has become much more
intensified given that shareholder’s moral hazard was also one of the biggest reasons
for the crisis. 269
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G.

Comparing the U.S. S&L Crisis, the U.S. Mortgage Crisis of 2008, and the

Korea Crisis
1.

The S&L Crisis and the Mortgage Crisis of 2008

The S&L Crisis and the mortgage crisis of 2008 have very similar causes and
solutions. The similar causes were deregulation, fluctuant interest rates, risky lending,
moral hazard, and inappropriate regulations. 270 The real estate crash, delinquencies,
and asset securitization were also causes. 271 Multiple solutions to the crises were also
similar. 272 The similarities in the U.S. government’s solutions included: increasing
depository insurance coverage, removing existing regulatory systems as a punishment
of regulatory agencies, and intensifying the standard of regulation and supervision
after the crisis. 273
Deregulation from regulatory agencies took place in both crises, and the thrift
industry benefited from more lenient regulations. Due to the lenient regulations,
thrifts were able to engage in high-risk and high-return activities, which was one of
the significant causes of the S&Ls crisis. Thrifts received lenient regulations from
regulatory agencies because thrifts had serious operating difficulties due to the
disintermediation after double-digit interest rates were placed on markets. 274 Similar
to the S&L crisis, there was also deregulation prior to the mortgage crisis of 2008.
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The regulatory agency for the U.S. thrift industry was the OTS, and it put lenient
regulations on the industry because the agency wanted to keep thrifts under their
supervision by receiving assessment fees, which comprised a significant portion of
their operating budget. 275 If they put too stringent regulations on the industry, thrifts
would change their supervisory agency to the OCC. As a result, in order to not lose
the industry to other agencies, such as the OCC, the OTS loosened its level of
supervision on the thrifts.
The deregulation not only enabled thrifts to engage in risky investment but
also resulted in risky lending, moral hazard, and inappropriate supervisions. If
regulatory agencies had put more intense regulations on thrifts, risky lending practices
and moral hazard could have been avoided. Regarding inappropriate supervisions,
lenient regulations were the primary cause, but the quality of thrift regulators was also
worse than regulators of the commercial banking industry. 276
The real estate crash, delinquencies, and asset securitization also contributed
to the crisis. 277 Thrifts are very closely related to the real estate market. When the
housing market is in good condition, thrifts have less credit risks because people who
borrow money from thrifts as real estate mortgage loans are more likely to make
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profits by selling or renting out their property. 278 Thus, the borrowers are more likely
to pay back their loans with the interest going to thrifts. In addition to individual
borrowers, real estate developers and other market participants borrow money from
thrifts, resulting in more profits. However, when the housing market is in a bad
condition, thrifts are exposed to greater credit risk. When the real estate market shows
poor performance, individual borrowers may face difficulties in paying back their
loan. 279 Also, regarding asset securitization, thrifts may not be able to sell their bonds
to third parties to obtain more funds because the bonds that thrifts issue seem less
reliable when the housing market is bad.
In addition to the causes of the crises, the solutions were similar as well. After
the S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis, the U.S. government increased insurance
coverage for deposits to help create a more stable financial market; however, this
could have caused, to some extent, moral hazard. The U.S. government also reformed
the regulatory system by drafting and enacting much more stringent regulations, but
reforming the regulatory systems seems to have only reprimanded some of the
regulatory agencies, and did not actually provide practicable actions aimed at solving
the crisis or preventing a future crisis. 280
The government has tried to remove the “too big to fail” theory through
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regulatory reforms following the crises, but the effectiveness of the reforms remains
to be seen. 281 After the S&L crisis, the U.S. government enacted the IBBEA to enable
bank holding companies to become large in scale as long as the BHCs were “wellcapitalized and well-managed.” 282 Thus, this Act could have contributed to the
fallacy of “too big to fail.” The Dodd-Frank Act, after the mortgage crisis, also
permitted bank holding companies to grow big as long as they are “well-capitalized
and well-managed.” 283 Although the U.S. government has tried to eliminate the issue
through new legislation, the government has failed to attack the “too big to fail”
problem properly. For these reasons, the U.S. government has often been criticized for
not having learned from previous experience. 284
2.

The S&L Crisis and the Korean Savings Bank Crisis

The S&L crisis and the current Korean savings bank crisis share many
commonalities. Firstly, external economic factors contributed to the crises. 285 In the
U.S., after the Great Depression, the collapse of the financial housing market was the
main factor for the S&L crisis, and in Korea, the global financial crisis of 2008 was
the cause of the current savings bank crisis. 286 Because savings institutions in both
countries operate within a more limited sector of the market than the commercial
banking industry, they are more easily affected by external economic circumstances.
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Secondly, deregulation in both countries led to the crises. The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) and Garn-St
Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982 (Garn-St Act), are the typical examples of
deregulation for the savings and loan industry in the U.S. 287 As mentioned above, the
purpose of these acts was to assist troubled thrifts, but thrifts used the assistance to
invest in high-risk and high-return activities. In Korea, the change of the official title
from savings and finance company to savings bank was the clear manifestation of
deregulation. 288 Because of the new official title for savings banks, they could
participate in a wider spectrum of activities with less regulation.
Increased deposit insurance was also one cause of the crises in both countries.
In the U.S., the deposit insurance was increased from $40,000 to $100,000 pursuant to
the DIDMCA. 289 Korean deposit insurance for savings banks was increased from
approximately $20,000 to $50,000. 290 With weaker regulation and increased
depository insurance coverage, U.S. savings institutions pursued high-risk and highreturn investment, and moral hazard spread.
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Korean savings banks also

experienced the same problems of seeking high-risk and high-return business, and of
moral hazard of the large shareholders and CEOs. 292 A CEO or a large shareholder
was able to own a thrift in both countries, and this resulted in severe moral hazard,
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which was one of the main reasons for both crises. 293
Finally, insolvency processes of savings institutions were very similar
between both countries. The U.S. government encouraged prime institutions to take
over insolvent savings institutions, and the Korean authority also persuaded prime
institutions to take over failed savings institutions by giving several enticing favors,
all of which resulted in much worse outcomes in both countries. 294 For the U.S., if
the government had promptly closed failed savings institutions at the start of the S&L
crisis, the government could have avoided spending the huge amount of money that
fell on the taxpayers.
3.

The Mortgage Crisis and the Korean Savings Bank Crisis

The mortgage crisis and the Korean savings bank crisis have similar aspects
with respect to risky lending activities and regulator’s inappropriate actions against
the activities. One of the fundamental problems that U.S. thrifts and Korean savings
banks have seems to be the fact that they both have fewer business models than their
competitors, namely, the commercial banks. They need their exclusive area of
business to maintain stability no matter how competitive financial markets are. But
without providing solutions to the fundamental problem, U.S. thrifts and Korean
savings banks may have continued seeking higher profit by participating in risky
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lending activities or new activities that they have not entered before.
Prior to the mortgage crisis, thrifts participated in a high-risk lending practice,
called pay-option ARM, and other risky practices. 295 All practices were deemed high
risk because lenders placed a greater emphasis on making loans rather than making
sure that borrowers had the ability to pay their loans back. This risky practice was
possible because the regulatory agencies allowed thrifts to do so. 296 The riskier the
lending practice thrifts participated in, the higher the interest rates they received. The
regulatory agencies also benefited from this situation in the foam of assessment fees
that thrifts under their supervision paid for regulation and supervision. 297
During the mortgage crisis of 2008, the seven biggest depository financial
institutions failed, and five of them were thrifts. 298 The pay-option ARM was one of
the contributing factors of the mortgage crisis, and four of the big five originators of
pay-options ARMs in the U.S. were thrifts as well. 299 Thrifts, including big thrifts,
engaged in high-risk lending activities, and regulators did not appropriately regulate
and supervise against this. As a result, big thrifts went bankrupt and their existing
regulator, the OTS, could not avoid being criticized and was eventually abolished.
Similar to the U.S. experience, large Korean savings banks, including the
biggest savings bank, also failed mostly due to high-risk lending practices, such as
295
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Project Financing. 300 PF is similar to the ARM because lenders were not sure whether
borrowers had the ability to pay back their loans. Without any guarantee, savings
banks made loans to borrowers based more on prospects, and not on the borrower’s
ability to pay them back. When borrowers failed to pay loans back to the savings
banks, the banks met serious difficulties, which led to the savings bank crisis in Korea.
The regulatory agencies were also illegally connected to the officers, directors, and
large shareholders of savings banks. The crisis occurred because of the combination
of high-risk lending practices, deregulation, and the corruption of regulators.
4.

Summary and Comments

The S&L crisis and the mortgage crisis were huge crises, precipitated by
multiple causes. In response to both crises, the U.S. government provided similar
solutions. Deregulation was a main causes of the crises, and in response the U.S.
government tried to intensify regulations to both solve the current crises and prevent
the occurrence of a future crisis. However, the government’s attempt to strengthen
regulations was limited to changing regulatory agencies, and it seems that the
government did not consider business prospects.
In addition, although the government intensified some of the regulatory
standards, such as the capital requirement and other limitations, the regulatory
agencies failed to evaluate their own financial conditions due to the corruption within
agencies like the OTS. 301 Without correctly assessing the conditions of thrifts, the
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increased regulations were useless. After the mortgage crisis of 2008, the government
tried to respond to the crisis by intensifying regulatory standards, but there was still
corruption among regulators, which rendered the new regulations useless.
The U.S. government punished the regulatory agency responsible for the
crisis by abolishing the OTS. The U.S. government also increased regulations through
the Dodd-Frank Act, but may not have considered the balance between market
conditions and regulation. In addition, the theory of “too big to fail” has not
disappeared, probably due to the exceptions in the Act, which permit bank holding
companies to grow bigger so long as they are “well-capitalized and well-managed.”302
Only time can tell whether this regulation is appropriate. And, contrary its purpose,
which was the consolidation of the regulatory system, the Dodd-Frank Act created
more regulatory agencies, which increased both regulatory costs and the burden on
regulated institutions.
Appropriate deregulation through legislation was needed because in order to
revitalize the financial market, deregulation is sometimes needed to deal with
unexpected situations in the market. But Congress often allows deregulation of the
financial market in order to avoid being blamed when a depressed financial market
negatively affects the economy. At that time, the legislators merely passed a lenient
statute to normalize financial markets without considering other relevant factors.
Furthermore, the government should have trained regulators of savings institutions to
be as good as the regulators of the commercial banking industry, rather than punishing
This likely happened from the OTS’s corruption, and insufficiently trained staff. See KATHLEEN, supra
note 6, at 177, 184.
302

Docking, supra note 1, at 25.
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the regulators of savings institutions. Most of the employees from the OTS have been
transferred to new regulatory agencies, and the employees responsible for savings
institutions should be educated and trained so that they can have the same level of
competency as those who are responsible for the commercial banking industry. Lastly,
current insurance coverage should be adjusted as it may have adverse effects on the
financial institutions investing in high-risk activities.
Regarding deregulation, the relationship between regulation and the market
must be considered. In order to provide a safe and reliable market environment for
thrifts and savings banks, the government should strive for a balance between
regulation and market concerns. In the financial market, the regulatory system cycles
between deregulation and strong regulation; unexpected situations can happen at any
time, and this may result in one form or the other. In general, after every financial
crisis, the cycle of regulation should be acknowledged in order to solve the problem
and prevent another crisis, as well as when the market needs to be revitalized. The
following are examples of the cycle in the U.S. and Korea.
In the U.S., every financial crisis has resulted in stronger regulations enacted
by legislators. 303 With the increased regulation, the market may suffer. For instance,
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, smaller banks would be required to spend much
more on compliance costs, and be forced to observe increased standardization
requirements that may harm customers. 304 Small banks usually deal with customers
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who have lower credit rates, but increased regulations limit the ability of small banks
to deal with these customers. Unlike commercial banks, if small banks lose their main
customers, they cannot survive due to the limited nature of their financial products.
This may eventually result in the failure of small banks, and their main customers
may be unable to access financial services.
However, when financial markets begin failing, legislators often provide
weak regulations in order to prevent the economy from weakening. Thus,
deregulation may help the market improve. For example, Congress enacted the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in order to allow thrifts to grow by participating in new
activities across all states. 305 With this deregulation, thrifts were able to expand their
industry.
In addition to the regulation and market cycles in the U.S., in Korea,
deregulation positively affected the savings bank market. The total asset size of
Korean savings banks in 2010 increased by more than three times from 2003 under
deregulation that allowed savings banks to expand their branches. 306 This may prove
that deregulation assisted savings banks to develop their business and to increase their
size. 307 Also, in order to promote competitiveness of the financial industry, Korea has
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tried to seek deregulation for the last decade. 308 This may mean deregulation is
positively used to develop the financial industry in Korea. Of course, the Korean
government needs to improve its supervisory and regulatory system in order to create
a sound and safe financial market. However, increased regulations without analyzing
market characteristics may prevent financial institutions from increasing their
competitiveness.
In conclusion, the balance between regulation and market conditions is very
important for savings institutions in both the U.S. and Korea. Strong regulation
without considering market conditions may create obstacles for the continued
existence of savings institutions. In addition, creating lenient regulations without
appropriate alternatives for savings institutions may lead to investments in high-risk
activities, which may result in a financial crisis. In this sense, legislators in the U.S.
and Korea should make balancing regulation and market conditions their primary
objective.
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VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE U.S. THRIFT INDUSTRY

The purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was to solve the mortgage crisis and to
prevent future crises. 1 However, the Act may have adverse effects on the thrift
industry. First, the Act is not consistent with the guiding principles of the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), which are to pursue the most effective and efficient
financial regulatory system. 2 Although one of the purposes of the Act was to
consolidate regulatory systems, the regulatory system has become much more
complex since the Act came into effect. 3
Pursuant to the Act, four regulatory agencies responsible for thrift supervision
were created in place of the OTS. 4 This complex regulatory system may create turf
battles among the regulatory agencies. Under the dual banking system in the U.S.,
regulatory agencies try to increase the number of thrifts under their supervision in
order to earn more assessment fees, and they do this by providing more lenient
regulations than the other regulatory agencies. 5 In order to eliminate the turf battles
among the agencies, the U.S. government should consider consolidating the complex
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regulatory system in accordance with the suggestion from the GAO. The U.S.
government should also consider creating a new budget system to control the possible
turf battles. One possibility is a budget system that would regularly distribute
operating budgets to each regulatory agency irrespective of the number of regulated
institutions each agency supervises.
As regulatory agencies compete with each other to earn assessment fees from
the institutions that are under their supervision, the regulatory agencies are more
likely to provide inappropriate or undesirable benefits to the institutions under their
regulation. This is also not accordance with the principle of the GAO, which holds
that a regulatory agency should be independent from its regulated institutions. 6 As
long as regulators are dependent on regulated institutions for assessment fees, they
cannot fairly or appropriately regulate and oversee the institutions that are under their
supervision. The U.S. government could also use the new budget system, used to
control turf battles, to make regulatory agencies independent from their regulated
institutions by collectively pooling and distributing operating budgets to the agencies.
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, regulatory agencies made the commercial
banking industry and the thrift industry subject to nearly the same extent of
regulation. 7 The regulatory agencies treat mid-sized and large thrifts with a similar
degree of regulation as commercial banks, and regulate smaller thrifts as community
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banks. 8 However, thrifts may struggle to comply with such requirements under the
Act because the commercial banking industry and the thrift industry are considerably
different with respect to size, business model, financial customers, and limitations.
Regulating the commercial banking industry and the thrift industry in the same
manner is opposed to one of the main principles of the GAO, which suggests that
regulators should put differentiated regulations on financial institutions that pose
different risks. 9 As thrifts likely pose much less of a risk to the financial market than
commercial banks do, they should be regulated to a lesser degree.
In addition to failing to comply with the principles of the GAO, the DoddFrank Act also imposes an additional penalty if thrifts do not comply with the QTL
test, which requires thrifts to invest more than 65% of all assets into residential
mortgage loans. 10 Prior to the Act, even if thrifts failed to comply with the QTL test,
they had a grace period of one year to comply with the test, but this grace period was
eliminated by the Act. 11 The government should reconsider reinstating the grace
period of the QTL test because thrifts occupy a smaller portion of the mortgage
lending business than before. Because of the test, thrifts are vulnerable whenever the
housing market and the U.S. economy are unstable.
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requirement should be adjusted based on the decreased portion that thrifts occupy in
the mortgage lending market.
In addition, U.S. regulatory agencies should be more independent from their
government’s stance on financial policy. Because the agencies are bound by their
government’s policy agenda, regulatory agencies may struggle to act and manage
efficiently during a financial crisis. For example, if during a financial crisis, the
regulatory agencies find it necessary to immediately close failed institutions, but the
government’s policy is to promote acquisitions, the regulatory agencies cannot act
contrary to the government’s position. For this reason, regulatory agencies should be
independent from the government’s financial policy agenda in order to act
appropriately and swiftly during a crisis.
Next, regarding the regulators of thrifts, most of the employees have
transferred from the OTS to the new regulatory agencies that regulate thrifts. 13 These
are the same employees who failed to supervise and regulate thrifts when they worked
under the OTS, and it is doubtful whether they can now do a good job regulating
thrifts based solely on the fact that they moved to new agencies. In order to improve
thrift regulation, these employees should be better educated and trained by the new
agencies.
Lastly, but most importantly, thrifts need to occupy their own business area
and not participate in high-risk activities like the ARMs. Because the thrift industry
had lost much of its business to competitors, it was pushed to engage in risky
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investments. To prevent thrifts from engaging in high-risk activities, the thrift industry
should be permitted to enjoy some level of protection, and occupy their own business
area without losing it to their competitors.
VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR KOREAN SAVINGS BANKS

One of the main causes of the Korean savings banks crisis was owners’ moral
hazard. 14 The owners or largest shareholders of savings banks illegally used their
bank’s deposits for private purposes. 15 In response to this problem, the Korean
government added new regulations to strengthen the monitoring and supervision over
such misuses. 16 However, it is still doubtful whether the additional regulations can
prevent owners or the largest shareholders from doing illegal activities. This is
because there already had been provisions in place to prevent them from doing illicit
activities, but those provisions proved to be ineffective. 17 In order to prevent the
misuse of power by a single owner, and learning from the U.S. regulation of thrifts,
the number of owners for each savings bank should be at least five. 18 To this end, it is
necessary for the Korean legislature to draft and enact new provisions on the
corporate governance structure of savings banks.

14

Choi, Young-joo, The Influence of Large Shareholder in Savings Bank Insolvency and Regulation,
53 PUSAN NAT’L UNIV. L. REV. 193, 194 (2012).

15

Id. at 211.

16

Sangho jeochukeunhaengbeob [Mutual Savings Banks Act], Act No. 12100, Aug. 13, 2013, art. 22(6)
(S. Kor.). With this additional provision, the regulatory agency now has more authority to monitor and
supervise CEOs of savings banks in order to prevent the illegal activities.

17

See Choi, supra note 14, at 221.

18

12 C.F.R. §144.5 (b)(8).
137

Regulatory agencies’ corruption was also one of the reasons for the crisis. 19 In
order to prevent corruption in regulatory agencies, regulators of savings banks should
be thoroughly educated not to be involved in such corruption. The Korean
government should provide a program for such education thereby improving the
quality of supervision by the regulatory agency for savings banks. With better quality,
we may expect the corruption to be eradicated.
On top of the direct causes of the savings banks crisis, many concerns were
also raised in the aftermath of the crisis. The Korean government actively
recommended that other healthy financial institutions acquire insolvent savings
banks. 20 During the process of such acquisitions, the government provided several
benefits, such as deregulation, to the acquirers as a trade-off. 21 By doing so, the
government was able to cut its rescue expenses. However, it should be of great
concern that this policy may lead to a much bigger disaster in the future as the U.S.
precedent of the late 1980s shows.
After the S&L crisis, the U.S. government preferred the acquisition of
insolvent thrifts by other financial institutions to closures, but such acquisitions
resulted in a much bigger disaster. 22 Considering the U.S. precedent and the currently

19

See Jaeho, Chun, the FSS Already Forgot the Nightmare of the Savings Banks Crisis, CHOSUNBIZ,
Mar. 19, 2014, available at http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/03/19/2014031901518.html.
20

Choi, supra note 14, at 202 (the Korean government chose the policy of merger and acquisition as a
solution for the savings banks crisis, but it made the crisis much worse).
21

Id. at 202–203.

22

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT,
ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1993) (if the government closed the insolvent thrifts instead
of the acquisition, the cost the government spent to solve the S&L crisis were not over $25 billion).
138

unstable condition of Korean savings banks, the Korean government should
contemplate closing down insolvent savings banks rather than helping them through
acquisitions. Also, regulatory agencies should be able to manage and supervise
separately from their government’s financial policy agenda. Even though the
Financial Supervisory Services is an independent agency from the Korean
government, the FSS’s decisions are still affected by the government’s policy. In the
case of a financial crisis, closing failed institutions is often the best solution, but the
government’s inclination is to delay the closure and to promote acquisitions. The
regulatory agencies, therefore, cannot close the failed institutions, and this situation
may result in a bigger crisis in the future. For this reason, financial regulatory
agencies should be more independent from their government.
It is undeniable that the increased insurance coverage for deposits has resulted
in moral hazard committed by many owners of savings banks. 23 Similar to the
Korean savings bank crisis, the deposit insurance increase was one of the reasons for
the S&L crisis in the U.S. The managers of thrifts used the insurance to make bad
decisions. 24 However, after the S&L crisis, the U.S. government failed to provide the
right solutions to the problem of deposit insurance. 25
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In response to this problem, the Korean government should provide lower
insurance coverage to the savings bank industry. Current coverage for deposit
insurance in Korea is approximately $50,000, which applies to all financial depository
institutions. However, as savings banks are required to keep lower capital than
commercial banks, the coverage should be less than the current level for savings
banks. Because savings banks have their particular consumer base, such as lowincome people, providing lower deposit insurance coverage may not hurt the business
of savings banks. For these reasons, the government should reconsider the current
insurance system for depository institutions.
The Korean government eased the Loan to Value ratio to promote its housing
market. 26 But, after easing the ratio, if the housing market turns for the worse,
financial institutions will face higher risks. Prior to the S&L crisis in the U.S., the U.S.
government similarly eased the Loan to Value ratio, which was one of the reasons for
the crisis. 27 The Korean government, learning from the U.S. experience, should
reconsider the ratio in order to prepare for any unexpected future downturns in the
housing market.
Lastly, it should be noted that both U.S. thrifts and Korean savings banks
participated in high-risk activities. Korean savings banks have been experiencing
difficulties in earning profits due to severe competition with commercial banks, and
having no other choice, they were pushed into engaging in high-risk activities. In this
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sense, similar to the suggestion for the U.S. thrift industry, Korean savings banks
should be able to enjoy some protection for their particular business area. Without
such protection, deregulation and any other friendly policy on savings banks may not
prove to be effective. In addition, because savings banks are especially vulnerable to
the condition of the housing market, they need to have their own business area in
order to reach and maintain financial stability.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The adoption of more stringent regulations has followed every financial crisis
in order to prevent a future financial crisis. However, rather than considering how the
new regulations would affect financial markets, the U.S. government focused more on
enhancing the regulatory system. After the mortgage crisis of 2008, the U.S.
government enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank Act) to create a stable and sound financial market by protecting
financial consumers. 1 However, by heavily focusing on strengthening the regulatory
system, the Act may negatively affect the thrift industry. With the strengthened
regulations, the U.S. thrift industry may face serious trouble because the government
concentrated primarily on preventing another financial crisis without considering the
thrift’s unique situation. In order for thrifts to survive, the current regulatory system
needs to be reconsidered.
The Korean savings bank industry is still facing many difficulties despite
multiple attempts by the Korean government to solve the savings banks crisis. For this
reason, this dissertation suggests that the Korean government should provide
recommendations to the industry by reconsidering the unique conditions of the
Korean savings bank industry and by learning from U.S. experiences.
First, this dissertation discussed how the Dodd-Frank Act might adversely
affect the U.S. thrift industry with intensified regulations. 2 One of the purposes of the
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Act was to consolidate regulatory systems, but the Act actually creates even more
complex regulatory systems. This may cause turf battles among the regulatory
agencies. In order to consolidate the regulatory systems and avoid the turf battles, the
U.S. government should consider reforming the current regulatory system under the
Act in accordance with the principles suggested by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO). 3 The Act should comply with the following GAO principles: firstly,
the U.S. government should consider consolidating regulatory systems; 4 secondly,
regulatory agencies should be independent from their regulated institutions; 5 finally,
the regulatory agencies should place different regulations on commercial banks than
thrifts as thrifts pose different risks to the financial market. 6 In addition to
comporting with the GAO, the U.S. government should create a new budget system to
prevent the possible turf battles that result from having a complex regulatory system,
and to ensure that regulatory agencies are independent from their regulated
institutions. The assessment fees collected from regulated institutions cause problems
like the turf battles and the dependency of regulatory agencies, as most of the
agencies’ operating budget comes from the assessment fees. The new budget system
can solve these issues by pooling and distributing assessment fees to regulatory
agencies.
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In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act made no change to the Qualified Thrift
Lender (QTL) test, which requires thrifts to invest 65% of their total assets into
residential mortgage lending. 7 The Act even intensified the test by removing the oneyear grace period that allowed thrifts to meet the 65% requirement within a year from
when the thrifts failed to satisfy such requirement. 8 However, this test makes thrifts
especially vulnerable to a bad economy or unstable housing market. Because thrifts
currently occupy much less of the mortgage lending market than before, the U.S.
government should decrease the percentage of the QTL test and reinstate the grace
period. 9
U.S. regulatory agencies should also be more independent from their
government’s stance on financial policy. As long as the agencies’ decisions are
affected by their government’s policy, their regulatory ability will be limited and less
efficient in response to a crisis.
Next, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was
abolished and most employees from the OTS were transferred to new regulatory
agencies that are now in charge of supervising thrifts. 10 The quality of regulators for
thrifts had always been lower than that of regulators for commercial banks although
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the quality may be the same nowadays. 11 However, the OTS failed to appropriately
supervise and regulate the thrift industry. Therefore, in order to provide better quality
supervision and regulation of thrifts, the U.S. government should consider educating
and training the transferred regulators.
Most significantly, this dissertation analyzed why several of the biggest thrifts
engaged in high-risk and high-return investments, and then found that thrifts are now
faced with a harsh business environment because they lost a significant portion of
their business area to competition with other financial institutions in the mortgage
lending market. Rather than deregulating the thrift industry, the U.S. government
should consider providing some protection for their particular business area so that
they can recover to a stable condition without participating in high-risk activities.
Second, this dissertation discussed how Korean savings banks could overcome
their current difficulties since the Korean savings bank crisis began in 2010. As
mentioned previously, the Korean government can learn useful solutions from the U.S.
experience, as there are many similarities between the U.S. savings institutions and
the Korean savings banks. In order to prevent owners’ moral hazard of savings banks,
the Korean government added a new provision to the Mutual Savings Banks Act.
However, it is doubtful whether the additional provision will prove to be effective.
Therefore, the Korean government should add a new provision under which savings
banks are required to consist of at least five owners, so that they can hold each other

1 DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES−LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 170–171 (1997) (as the quality of regulatory employees for commercial banking industry were
higher than the quality of regulatory employees for thrift industry, the former employees received
salaries about thirty percent more than the latter employees received).
11
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in check. 12
Also, it cannot be denied that the owners’ moral hazard was closely connected
to regulators’ corruption and increased insurance coverage for deposits. In response to
corruption, the Korean government should consider systemically educating and
training regulators, thereby preventing them from engaging in illegal behavior.
Regarding the increased insurance coverage for deposits, the government should
provide lower insurance deposit coverage to the savings bank industry than that of
commercial banks as savings banks have lower capital requirements than commercial
banks.
In response to the Korean savings bank crisis, the government strongly
recommended that healthy financial institutions acquire insolvent savings banks.
However, the acquisition policy may cause a much bigger disaster in the future as a
similar situation happened in the late 1980s in the U.S. 13 The Korean government
should reconsider the policy by learning from U.S. precedent. In order to deal with a
future crisis, the regulatory agencies should be independent from their government’s
financial policy agenda. The agencies’ ability to respond to a crisis are limited and
less effective as long as the agencies’ regulatory and supervisory actions depend on
the current government’s stance on financial policy.
Rather than easing regulations on the savings banking industry, including the
Loan to Value ratio, the Korean government, learning from the U.S. experience of the

12

12 C.F.R. §144.5 (b)(8).

13

JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 187 (1991).
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1980s, should provide a unique environment to savings banks so that they can have
their own business area without having to engage in high-risk activities. As long as
the government protects the savings bank industry with respect to their unique
business area, the industry may be able to overcome its difficulties, and contribute to a
safe and sound financial market in Korea.
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 Appendix
[MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS ACT], Act No. 12100 Aug. 13, 2013 (S.
Kor.).
Article 1 (Purpose)
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the growth of the national economy by
guiding savings banks for sound operation to assist them in providing citizens and
small and medium enterprises with greater convenience in receiving financial services,
protecting customers, and maintaining credit system in good order.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010]
Article 4 (Business Area of Mutual Savings Banks)
(1) The business area of a mutual savings bank shall be any of the following areas
based on the location of its principal business office (hereinafter referred to as
"principal office"):
1. Seoul Special Metropolitan City;
2. The area covering Incheon Metropolitan City and Gyeonggi-do;
3. The area covering Busan Metropolitan City, Ulsan Metropolitan City, and
Gyeongsangnam-do;
4. The area covering Daegu Metropolitan City, Gyeongsangbuk-do, and Gangwon-do;
5. The area covering Gwangju Metropolitan City, Jeollanam-do, Jeollabuk-do, and
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province;
6. The area covering Daejeon Metropolitan City, Chungcheongnam-do, and
Chungcheongbuk-do.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a mutual savings bank which merges with another
mutual savings bank or receives contract transfer may include the business area of the
mutual savings bank which ceases to exist due to the merger or which makes the
contract transfer in its own business area.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010]
Article 7 (Restriction on Establishment of Branches, etc.)
(1) A mutual savings bank may not establish any branch office or liaison office
(which includes a branch office or administration office that performs part of its
business affairs, or any other similar place; hereinafter referred to as "branch office or
similar"), other than its principal office: Provided, That the foregoing shall not apply
in cases where a branch office or similar is established by the relevant mutual savings
bank within the business area under Article 4 after obtaining a license from the
Financial Services Commission as prescribed by Presidential Decree.
(2) Notwithstanding the proviso to paragraph (1), a mutual savings bank prescribed by
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Presidential Decree may establish a branch office or similar outside the business area
under Article 4 when it obtains a license as provided by Presidential Decree.
(3) A mutual savings bank seeking to establish a branch office or similar under the
proviso to paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) shall, for each of such branch office or
similar, increase the capital by an amount exceeding the amount prescribed by
Presidential Decree. In such cases, the capital means paid-in capital.
(4) The Financial Services Commission may attach conditions to a license granted
pursuant to the proviso to paragraph (1) and paragraph (2).
[This Article Newly Inserted by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010]

Article 9 (Use, etc. of Designation)
(1) Each mutual savings bank shall include the words "mutual savings bank" or
"savings bank" in its name.
(2) No person other than mutual savings banks under this Act may use such a title as
"mutual savings bank," "savings bank," "mutual savings company," "mutual loan
company," "people's bank," or any other similar title.
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010]
Article 11 (Business Activities)
(1) Any mutual savings bank may engage in the following business activities
systematically and continuously for profit:
1. Credit mutual aid deposit service;
2. Credit installment savings service;
3. Receipt of deposits and installment deposits;
4. Extension of loans;
5. Discount of commercial notes;
6. Domestic and foreign exchange of money;
7. Receipt of deposits for safekeeping;
8. Agency for collection and payment;
9. Intermediary or agency for corporate mergers and purchases;
10. Agency for the State, public organizations, and financial institutions;
11. Business affairs vicariously carried out for or entrusted by the Korea Federation of
Savings Banks under Article 25;
12. Issuance and management of electronic means for debit payment under the
Electronic Financial Transactions Act and settlement of payments therefor (In such
cases, the scope of business shall be limited to cases in which the business affairs of
the Korea Federation of Savings Banks under Article 25-2 (1) 9 are jointly carried
out);
13. Issuance, management, and sales of prepaid electronic means payment under the
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Electronic Financial Transactions Act and settlement of payments therefor (In such
cases, the scope of business shall be limited to cases in which the business affairs of
the Korea Federation of Savings Banks under Article 25-2 (1) 10 are jointly carried
out);
14. Investment brokerage business, investment trade business, and trust business
authorized by the Financial Services Commission under the Financial Investment
Services and Capital Markets Act;
15. Business activities incidental to those under subparagraphs 1 through 14 or those
required for achieving the purposes under Article 1, which are authorized by the
Financial Services Commission.
(2) The minimum maintenance ratio of the aggregate of credit extensions to private
individuals and small and medium enterprises within a business area to the amount of
total credit, and further detailed matters to be observed otherwise by a mutual savings
bank in carrying out its business activities under paragraph (1) shall be prescribed by
Presidential Decree.
(3) Each mutual savings bank shall facilitate convenience in financial services for
ordinary citizens and small and medium enterprises in compliance with this Act and
orders issued pursuant to this Act in carrying out its business activities under
paragraph (1).
[This Article Wholly Amended by Act No. 10175, Mar. 22, 2010]
Article 22-6 (Inspection of Large Shareholders, etc.)
(1) Where the Governor of the Financial Supervisory Service deems that a large
shareholder of a mutual savings bank is suspected of violating Article 12-3, he/she
may require an employee under his/her command to inspect the business and property
of the relevant large shareholder to a minimum extent necessary for such purpose.
(2) Where the Governor of the Financial Supervisory Service deems that a person
referred to in Article 37 (1) 1 and 2 is suspected of violating paragraphs (1) through (3)
of the same Article, he/she may require an employee under his/her command to
inspect the business and property of the relevant person to a minimum extent
necessary for such purpose.
(3) Article 23 (2) and (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis to inspections under
paragraphs (1) and (2).
[This Article Newly Inserted by Act No. 12100, Aug. 13, 2013]
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